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PRKFACE
Ther3 is a popular opinion propagated by Hollywood movie
makers and pulp-magazine writers that the Army that fought
the Indians in the West after the War 3etween the States was,
if the hero was an officer, a glorious assemblage of giants
eligible for Valhalla. Or, if the hero was a cowboy, the
Army was a bunch of children who could barely feed themselves.
The historical inaccuracy of these artistic efforts is quite
obvious. But one of these stories, despite its misconception
of the truth, contained a phrase that caught the present
author's eye — "the police power of a nation riding in forty
saddle boots." This bit of poetry had little meaning to the
outcome of the tale, but the rhythm of it kept repeating itself
until it finally ripened into a desire to discover Just what
this Army was like, what it did, and how it lived.
There was no interest in the moral problems in the
situation in the write e's idle wonderings. The controversy
over the treatment of the Indian has its historical importance
even as do the speculations concerning the various military
catastrophes of the Indian wars.
3ut above these moral problems there lay a memory of histor-
ical events that was composed of the daily living of the char-
acters in the human story. These things had their historical
importance too, and the historian must take the records and
mentally recreate those events and attempt to pursue the
thinking of the men who faced the daily problems and provided
some solution to them. These were the things that attracted
attention and determined the course of this study.
The question may be asked, What may be gained from such
a study? Beyond personal satisfaction and the simple process
of recreating from contemporary accounts a word lcture of a
moment in history, the efficiency of a particular armed force
can be evaluated, its weaknesses can be elaborated, its strength
can be defined. One can measure these things by a study of
an army's success in battle and its winning or losing of its
wars. These are the contributions of this study to that body
of knowledge called history.
The maturation of this desire to investigate the armed
force of the D. S. that fought the Plains Indians led to the
scanty supply of secondary material, much of it lacking in
scholarship, that has become a part of our literary heritage.
When it was found that this aspect of the story had not been
the subject of any research the author proceeded to the enormous
collection of reminiscences and memoirs that were smothering in
dust and their own bad grammar on the library shelves. Most
of the fact3 contained in this study were gleaned from these
latter sources, despite their obvious personal bias. When many
of these facts proved unverifiable by official documents, the
author was forced to depend on his personal experience in the
armed sorviee and accept or reject the information by analogous
reasoning; a process that was defended by the necessity for
verification of some sort and, more logically, by the accuracy
of such reasoning instances that could be verified by official
records. When the Secretory of War Reports and government
documents were reached, their dry language had come alive with
humor, pathos, and heroism. Then came a fascinating discovery
of virgin material in the form of letters which had been written
and forgotten and were reposing in the library at. Fort Riley,
Kansas. More source material was found in the Kansas Historical
Association Library archives In a microfilm of a series of orders
issued at Fort Hays, Kansas.
As the saturation point was reached, a conviction began
to grow that this Army was as distinctive in character as the
Army that fought World War II. Its development, both psycho-
logically and physically, was slow, but steady, from a motley
aggregation into what is perhaps the only class of professional
fi -hting men ever developed in the United States.
In reduoing the conglomeration of facts to show this
development, those general factors — the problem, the ter-
rain, the enemy, the living conditions, the men, and the officers —
were treated in a general fashion to set the stage for the chrono-
logical development that followed. Campaigns and battles were
treated only enough to substantiate the conclusion of consistent
improvement in the efficiency of the Indian-fighting Army that
was demonstrated in the general development of isolated problems.
The battles were considered for this reason alone. Yet this
reason is sufficient for the proof of the pudding is in the eating,
and success in battle is the purpose of any armed force.
vli
Here then, is a romantic story, a decade of the history
of the deeds and way of living of a few men. There are a few
side issues that present themselves in the text, but the fas-
cinating tale of the Army's share in the conquest of the West
reveals itself in all its dirt and beauty, vermin and glory,
and cowardice and bravery.
The author wishes to express his indebtedness to the
soldiers of the United States Army whose unromantic duty it
is to care for the library of the Army General School at
Fort Riley, Kansas. In that old limestone building with
its funny cupola and clock tower (a relic of the old days of
Port Riley), these modern counterparts of the heroes of this
story took a paternal interest in a fumbling amateur research
worker and dug out more dust-covered material than he could
have dreamed of finding. The writer is also deeply indebted
to Dr. Verne S. Sweedlun of the Department of History and
Government whose experienced hand can be seen steadying every
aspect of this study — in the direction of effort, the clari-
fication of a stumbling prose style, and the organization of
a bewildering mass of material.
JHAPTBR X
THE MILITAHX PROBLEM OF THE PLAINS
With a frontier emstantly extending and encroaching upon the
hunting-grounds of the Indian, hostilities, opposition at
least, frequently occurs.1
General U. S. Grant, General of the Army.
The United States has had a unique element of continuity
in the history of its westward expansion and the leavening
factor of the frontier community. These factors were planted
with the first English settlement in the Mew World. The idea
of Manifest Destiny, the political slogan of the presidential
election of 18M*, became a part of the cultural complex of the
Amerloan people at the inception of their cultural integrity.
The desire for fur, for gold, and for land created the population
movement that ebbed and flowed over three centuries from the
Atlantic coast to the Pacific Ocean and that movement slowly
spread the culture of Europe over the span of the continent.
The last area that this movement oecuppied was that central
portion known as the Great Plains and the Mountain Region that
bordered it.
Within that region lived a race of primitive fighting men
that had to be removed from the path of the advancing civiliza-
tion. The story of that removal was a story of naked force.
Both sides engaged In a brutal conflict that, in its totality,
had no redeeming virtues. The war was nothing more than the
1 Secretary of War, Annual Henort. 1866, 10.
collision of two incompatible cultures; the one struggling to
maintain its existence, the other fighting to expand Its bound-
aries to its self-determined limits. Retrospect reveals many
moral issues in the situation, but to the homesteader in Kansas
or the rancher in Wyoming there were no such issues. There was
only the fear of an attack by an unreasoning hate-filled Indian
who was incapable of realizing the potential value of the land
he had held for centuries and he must therefore be removed.
These homesteaders and ranchmen, as citizens of the United
States, had an instrument available to them to effect this de-
sired end. That instrument was the United States Army. It had
not been necessary to employ the full strength of the army at
this task until after the War Between the States. Prior to
that national crisis the frontier had expanded in other direc-
tions. The post-war period, however, saw the tide of settlement
begin to move into the area of the Great Plains. The building
of railroads, the discovery of precious metals In the mountain
regions fringing the area, and the prospect of free land through
the homestead act attracted men to this last frontier. These
citizens demanded the protection of the armed might of the United
States and their demands were acknowledged by the transfer of a
major portion of the army into the region.
The military force of the United States was at one of its
highest peaks of efficiency. The high command, boasting such
names as Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, worked in perfect har-
mony and understanding. The regimental officers were men with
combat experience} many of them had held general officer's com-
missions In the war. The equipment In the hands of this army-
had been good enough to win one of the hardest fought wars in
modern history. The harassed citizens of the border naively
imagined that this gigantic military machine could be turned
loose on these few primitive savages and the difficulty would
be settled in a brisk and efficient manner.
The task was much more difficult than had been anticipated.
It dragged through 2? years of constant war before the obvious
outcome was reached. The Army slowly realized that it had been
assigned an enormous problem In military science that would re-
quire many changes in its methods before this duty could be ac-
complished.
This particular aspect of the history of the United States
Army revealed the influence of both human and nonhuman forces.
The strategic problem posed by the conquest of the Indians of
the Western United States possessed difficulties In the geogra-
phy of the region, in the material and men available for the
use of commanders, the quality of the officer corps, the admin-
istrative difficulties created by a decentralized administration,
the funds available, and the ability of the enemy to wage war.
The irresponsible continental climate of the West ranged
from deadly cold to enervating heat. Such a variation demanded
clothing and equipment that was adaptable to the climatic extremes
of the region before a military force could operate with any de-
gree of efficiency.
Even more difficult to solve was the problem of space.
Tremendous distances made the tactical objectives of speed in
closing with the enamy and sufficient stamina to carry home the
assault were major problems for the field commander. The same
distances magnified the problem of troop movements and logistics
in a geometrical progression. Logistics, the provision of means
of transportation for rations, clothing, forage, and ammunition,
depended upon wagon trains and pack mules, and these traditional
modes of military transport were insufficient to cope with the
vast reaches of the Great American Jesert.
The same nonhuman element, space, had an lnsiduous effect
upon the morale of the men who garrisoned the posts of the West.
Isolated from any comforts of home, exhausted by endless march-
ing or bored by months of idleness, and constantly threatened
by a seemingly invisible enemy, the private soldier and the
officer came to view the empty void as an ogre and an enemy
as dangerous as the red man.
The feet that this was not an army of veterans made this
factor all the more potent. True, many of the men had seen
service in the War Between the States, but the mark of veteran
soldiery came not from mere service. This Army was composed
of men who enlisted for personal reasons and it lacked the unity
and cohesive spirit found in a volunteer army mobilized for a
cause. The fundamental esprit de corps was notably lacking in
the Regular Army during the early years of this decade.
The officers, too, did not help the situation. Moat of
them had seen service but they, like the enlisted men, lacked
any Incentive to improve their professional skill. Few, if any,
of the field officers or enlisted men realized the seriousness
of these border troubles with the Indians. Too many of them
were not disposed to learn their duties in the Army of the West.
The situation in the Indian country demanded that every man
do the work of three men. Never in the history of the Plains
Indian Wars did military commanders have enough troops available
to assure the success of their planned operations. But the nature
of the Army accepted no excuses and the problem was perforce
attacked with ':he available forces.
This was the problem handed to the United States Regular
Army in 1866. For the next 10 years this military force would
wrestle with innumerable disaffections. Their roots lay in the
efficiency of its officer corps, the quality of its armament,
the quality of its rations, the conditions of health and sanita-
tion, poorly-adapted clothing, makeshift quarters, and the other
elements so important in the discipline and morale of armies.
These purely domestic military aspects, the family troubles, vould
be solved in that decade. By 1876 the Army of the West would be
an Indian-fighting Army, trained and equipped to meet the problems
of the irregular warfare of the Plains.
In 1865, the military leaders of the nation were just be-
ginning to make their initial estimate of the situation. Their
investigation of the vague information of the geography and the
capabilities of the various hostile Indian tribes revealed two
problems in military science. These problems, they decided,
could be isolated from each other by super-imposing a geographical
delineation on the region, whereby geographical and tactical unity
could be achieved and command responsibility could be assigned.
Thus the Military Division of the Missouri was created to contain
the horseman tribes of the Plains region as one problem and the
Military Division of the Pacific was to include the problem of
the desert tribes of Apaches. Which of the two was the more dif-
ficult to solve is hard to determine. But in 1866 the immediate
situation demanded action in the Military Division of the Missouri.
In this military division the Southern Cheyennes, the Kiowas,
the Arapahoes, and the Comanches ware striking savagely into
the nan settlements of farmers in central Kansas. To the north,
the Sioux Nation successfully challenged the might of the United
States Army in a war for the possession of the Powder River Valley
and the closing of the Bozeman Trail, a supply line of the Oregon
Territory.
- This was only the beginning. The Military Division of
the Missouri, which today roughly embraces the two tiers of states
from Oklahoma to North Dakota and Montana to northern New Mexico,
was to 3uffer from a series of savage outbreaks and more or less
continuous depredations. The war of attrition against the farmers
of Kansas and Nebraska and the freighters from Oregon lasted for
more than two years. In the southern department, the Department
of the Missouri, the red man was defeated. In the north, in the
Department of the Platte and the Department of the Dakotas, the
organizing genius of Red Cloud led the Sioux warriors to victory
and gave the Army its most humiliating defeat. Then, under the
administration of the Peace Policy, the opportunistic hostile
carried on an exasperating game of guerrilla warfare and intimida-
tion of government agents.
Another flaming war rocked the area in 1873. The first
outbreak was in the North where it was directed largely against
the building of the Northern Pacific railroad. Then the war-
riors in the South made another valiant attempt to throw back
the Invading plows of the farmers, an attempt that resulted in
the final smashing of the Southern Tribes. Hear the end of the
decade there came a violent outbreak in the North against the
invasion of the Black Hills by miners that rivalled the .jihad
of Islam. Through it all the police power of a nation rode on
the carbines dangling from the pommels of a few saddles.
Perhaps it is safe to say that the series of events that
filled this decade of the Army's history began at Sand Creek
in Colorado Territory near Fort Lyon on November 27, 186^, when
Colonel J. M. Chivington, an ex-Methodist minister, and his
First Colorado Cavalry regiment of volunteers committed what
"is perhaps the foulest and most unjustifiable crime in the
2
annals of America." The First Colorado sought and found Ind-
ians, any Indians, 3 on which to wreak its exasperation at a
futile chase after hostile raiders. On that morning a group
of American citizens, temporarily in the uniform of the United
States Army, murdered a band of friendly Cheyenne Indians who
slept under an American flag. And the recipients of this beast-
2 Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections . (New York, 1896),
139.
J Stanley Vestal, Warpath and Council Fire . (New York,
c. I9«t8), 68! '
ly assault never forgot that blood bath. Indeed, the embers
of the council fires of all the Plains Tribes breathed a fiery
warning to the grave elders, wherever they met in council, to
hold the white man in suspect. In one blow the Indian troubles
were magnified to gigantic proportions. There was no hope of
ever reaching an understanding settlenent between the white man
and the red man} only war to the knife remained after Sand Creek.
CHAPTER II
THE ENEMY.
The son of nature view is equally erroneous with that which
regards the Indian as a creature possessing the human form
but divested of all other attributes of humanity, and whose
traits of character, habits, modes of life, disposition, and
savage customs disqualify him from the exercise of all rights
and privileges, even those pertaining to life itself. 1
Drevet Major-General G. A. Custer, Commanding 7th United
States Cavalry.
One of the most important steps in a military commander's
estimate of the situation is to consider the strength, prowess,
and morale of his enemy. The military commanders of the Plains
departments were veterans of one of the bloodiest wars the
world had ever seen and, complacent in their experience, they
turned naively to the Indian problem and failed, initially,
to observe this cardinal principle of military leadership.
They failed to appreciate a fundamental difference between
themselves and their enemy in the approach to the problem of
war. To the veteran of four years of mass slaughter, war was
a science, a mathematical procedure whose determining factors
were surprise, shock action, and fire power, each of which con-
tributed to the cardinal objective, to fix and destroy the enemy.
Maneuver was the variable factor in the game and the terrain was
the controlling factor of maneuver.
To the Indian, however, war was an art rather than a
science. The possession and application of symbolic ritual
1
^c^lS^ir^"2 CuSter » Wlld Li^ on the Plains ,. (St. Louis,
10
in dance ceremonies, the feathered headdress, the painting of
the faoe and body contributed to success and failure, as much
as factors of terrain and fire power, by their psychological
impact upon the participants, both those blessed by the cere-
mony and those cursed by it. The accumulation of deeds of in-
dividual daring, whether they ware tactically important or not,
were as Important as winning a pitched battle to the Indian,
and they went far in determining his social and political sta-
tus in the group. Maneuver was to be used to avoid battle as
much as to gain desirable terrain from which to fight. Position
meant little or nothing to the Indian just as ownership of land
was an incomprehensible concept. Because of this it was nearly
impossible to force him to f lght at a disadvantage.2
In the Indian tribes of the Plains there was a nearly per-
fect adaptation of a neolithic culture to its environment.
Francis Parkman3 gave to pogt9rity an intimate picture of that
way of life. The organization into small tribal units, the
dwelling place, the accumulation of vast herds of horses, the
loosely defined tribal areas are all examples of an environ-
mental adaptation that was best suited to the capabilities of
their crude stone-age culture. In their trade with the tfaite
man they were offered and they aoeepted those elements of an
advanced culture that best fitted into their traditional way
of life. Out of their hunter economy, their small numbers,
Secretary of War, Annual Report
.
1875, l f 36.J Francis Parkman, Tne uregon Trail
, (Boston, 1927).
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and the vast theatar of operations, they developed a method
of warfare that fitted the situation admirably. Until almost
ten years of constant fighting with the white men taught them
the value of numbers, the Indians equipped themselves vith an
excellent moving remount and operated in small parties that
could move quietly and rapidly over vast stretches of terri-
tory without worrying too much about securing adequate amounts
of grass and water.* He learned to carry oooked rations and
to depend on game to fill in the menu if necessary.? Frequent
tribal warfare coupled with constant hunting taught him the
use of smoke screens and dust clouds and all the elements of
deception6 and the finer points of camouflage and concealment.
That the necessity of courage and fortitude was well known and
appreciated is evidenced by the religious significance that
was attached to the sun dance and other ascetic practices.
Iniividually the Indian was a fighting machine trained in the
crucible of experience and possessed with amazing skill in
warfare.
The political and social organization of the tribes demon-
strated the basic individualism of the red man and the tenuous
control of the group over the individual. Such was the power
of social mores that no chief or council could hope to hold
any young man who had decided upon a scalping party. Entranoe
to the council and warrior societies depended upon success in
£ Secretary of War, Annual Report. 1875, li8»t.
,
(St. Joseph, Mo., c. 1B94-;, 169-70. '
Senate, Document Ho. 68, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 1933.
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the field and the young man would choose the warpath alone
rather than suffer his personal ambition to be stifled.?
Such police control as there was within the group was
found in the warrior societies.® These secret fraternities
were composed of the able-bodied fighting men who had demon-
strated their capabilities as warriors. Within the organiza-
tion there was a rude form of democracy in the formulation of
plans. But to the other members of the tribal group they
offered little or no choice of alternative plans.9 From these
small groups and their elected leaders came the discipline
that welded the warriors into an effective mass. Out of these
two rudimentary political groups came the great leaders of the
red men,10 men whose names are synonymous In legend with war and
valor, names such as Red Cloud, Crazy Horse, Gall, Stone Calf,
Satank, and Sitting Bull. In these, and others like them, the
red men discovered sources of leadership and organizing ability
that, for sheer individual genius, equalled and, perhaps, sur-
passed the leadership gained from the intricate system of
training and selection used by the white man,
A study of the methods of assault and the selection of
bodies of troops to attack demonstrate the Indian's realiza-
? Phillippe de Trobriand, Army Life in Dakota . (Chicago, 19>fl),
266-7 j Maurice Greer Smith, "Political Organization of the
Plains Indians," University Studies of the University of
Nebraska . 2^:73, 1925. This is an excellent discus.-ion
„ of the council, its organization and powers
° Vestal, op. cit. . 158.
9 De Barthe, op. cit. . 158.
10 Smith, op. cit.
. 12, 73.
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tion of the capabilities of his weapons and equipment, i Since
he was usually mounted when Joining battle, the Indian of the
Plains evolved the tactics of circling which gave him the great-
est advantage of his horse and the best opportunity to close
with the enemy without injury to himself. As a result he great-
ly feared and frequently avoided the "walk-a-heaps," the
Infantry foot soldier, who did not run but formed squares and
fought whe e he stood with a long-range rifle and a bayonet
reserved to meet the final mounted assault.11
This greatest of all horsemen realized man's dependency
on the horse in traversing the tremendous distances of the
Plains, and he fought with that realization uppermost in his
mind. Stampeding grazing horses, killing horse holders in
the Initial stages of battle or killing the horses if necessary,
and stealing horses from the picket lines of army camps were
primary tactical objectives to the red man. when attacked by
mounted troops, the warrior shot to kill horses. If he found
himself outnumbered In the field, he would try to entice
pursuit with the object of exhausting the enemy's horses.i2
He knew that the Great American Desert defied the infantryman
when he opposed mounted hostiles. Cavalry troops were worse
than afoot when they lost their mounts, because the nature of
their service rendered them unaccustomed to foot marching,
their equipment was designed for mounted service, and their
11 Clark tfissler, Indians of the United States . (New York,
19^0), 263.
** John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook . (London, 1892),
2/'+, 257.
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reserves of ammunition were carried in the saddle bags on their
mounts. In such a situation the lightly-equipped horseman en-
joyed every advantage over dismounted troops for he could re-
tain the initiative at all times and could refuse or join battle
when and where it pleased him.
Only in the matter of ammunition supply did the troops
enjoy a permanent advantage over the red man.13 Lacking the
means of production of powder, the Indian spent much of his time
in accumulating this expondable material of war as well as the
more lasting weapons in which to use it.1^ It is true that most
of these arms and ammunition came to him Ihrough capture or by
illegal purchase as indicated by Byrne. 1? As a result the arms
traffic was lucrative business and since there was no means of
punishing offenders, except moral suasion which is notably weak
where a Yankee dollar is involved, most hostile tribes enjoyed
the company of gun-runners and were even able to purchase war
material from established merchants in towns.1^ But, in addition
to these, ^some weapons were issued to the Indians by the agents
of the Indian Bureau, which, it was quaintly believed, were used
in hunting, and these weapons were frequently the latest models,
even repeating rifles,17 in spite of the fact that the Indian pre-
13 Wissler, op. cit. . 259
}j 0. A. Custer, op. cit. . ^2.
15 p. E. Byrne, Soldiers of the Plains, (New York, 1926), 203.
1° Loring Benson Priest, Uncle Sam's Stepchildren
. (New Bruns-
wick, 19^2), 156
1/ Wissler, op. cit. . 260} Hister, op. clt. f 210-1.
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ferred and continued to use the bow in his hunting. These facts
rankled the hearts of the army officers and led their more lit-
erary representatives to emit blasts of sarcasm in print. 18
Official reports from the field as early as 1866 record the
armament of Indians as being "revolvers as well as rifles, m19
and Major Reno spoke with respect and feeling of the excellent
range of the weapons and the skill of the Indian marksmen in
the use of their firearms at the Little Dig Horn on June 26,
I876. 20 in addition to the records of Army officers and offic-
ial documents, there is the concurring testimony of the oft-
interviewed Rain-in-the-Face, who, upon being shown a painting
of the Custer massacre in 189>+ and being asked if it was cor-
rect, boastfully told the interviewer, W. Kent Thomas,
This picture gives us bows and arrows. We were
better armed than the long swords. Their guns wouldn't
shoot but once—the thing wouldn't throw out the empty
cartridge shells ... When we found they could not
shoot we 3aved our bullets by knocking the long swords
over with our war clubs—it was just like killing sheep.21
However, in evaluating the armament of the Plains Indian,
military leaders (and today's writers) frequently overlooked
the effectiveness of the indigenous weapon, the bow and arrow./
These weapons, uniquely adapted to use on horseback and in the
hands of its manufacturer (for the Indian boy used his own
ingenuity in making his first artillery and all of the future
18
~~ G. A. Custer, op. cit. . ^1-2.
^9 Senate, Executive Document No. 33, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.
Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1876, Ii33.21 Cyrus Townsend Brady, Indian Fights and Fighters . (New York,
1909), 285.
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Improvements he could devise)22 were deadly, fast-shooting
devices. 23 The Indian preferred using the bow at a short
range to increase its rapidity of fire and its effectiveness,
and his traditional tactics in battle, whether mounted or
dismounted, were premised on close-in fighting even after he
obtained firearms.2* Here was a weapon that the aborigine
could and did produce, in fact, spent most of his leisure
time at the ta3k, thus equalizing somewhat his deficiency in
respect to the assimilitated cultural trait, firearms. The
striking power of this weapon has been frequently and ably
attested by the contemporary accounts of those who faced it
in battle.2 ? Thus, while shortage of powder or a broken part
in his firearm might temporarily embarass the warrior, he was
never completely without defense.
Here, then, was a potential enemy whose qualities of
strength, skill, and armament were unrecognized and unappreciated
by the officers of the United States Army until they had exper-
ienced those qualities.26 Physically fit, trained by the life
they lived, taught the glories of war, tempted to those glories
by ambition, sensitive to tactical procedure, and well, if not
plentifully, armed, they went into battle superbly equipped to
test the metal of the shop keepers, clerks, farm boys, and bums
led by unseeing veterans of a more polite war.
22 Otis Tufton Mason. "North American 3ows, Arrows, and Quivers,"
Smithsonian Institution. Annual deport . 1893, 6U6.
2? Mrs. H. B. Carrington, Ab-sa-ra-ka
t (Philadelphia, 1868), 18?.
f* Mason, op , clt. T 6^7
2| Ibid., 6W.
^° Fairfax Downey, Indian-fiahtlns Army
,
(New York, 1 hi), Vt.
17
CHAPTER III
THE SERVICE
To protect the frontiers from depredating bands of Indians; to
assist the Department of the Interior to maintain its authority
on the various Indian reservations; to explore and survey un-
known territory: to aid the civil authorities in enforcing the
lavs and maintaining peace in remote districts; to escort nation-
al boundary. State and territorial surveying parties; to protect
and defend the advanced lines of railway in the far west . . .1
Lieutenant-General Philip Henry Sheridan, Commanding the Military
Division of the Missouri.
The Troops of the Service
The armies of war that have been spawned by the United States
have usually been smothered with philosophical and moral virtues
that condone the destruction and human misery that they have dis-
pensed. 3ut the Regular Army of 1866 was not an army of war; its
uniform was about as awe inspiring to the citizens of the nation as
the policeman on the corner of every city, and its purpose and Its
functions were similar to those of a police officer. This Army
was expected to care for itself by building its own quarters, largely
from native materials,2 to carry its own water, and to cut its own
wood and ice.3 When there was spare time its men were detailed
to repair cisterns, roofs, and sewage disposal sinks on the estab-
lished posts.T All of this came under the official label
1 Secretary of War, An.ual Report . 1871*, Ii23.
2 Secretary of War, Annual lleport . 1866, 17; Kansas City limes .
August 7, 1939.
J James Parker, The Old Army, (Philadelphia, c. 1939), 21.
* Out^oinHj Letters. ia66-1068 . Fort Riley, Kansas, MS in Army
General School Library, Letter dated March 18, 1866.
Hereinafter cited as Port Riley, Letters .
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of labor of the troops.
This "labor of the troops" was a great thing.
It made the poor wretch who enlisted under the vague
notion that his admiring country needed his servicss to
quell hostile Indians, suddenly find himself a brevet
architect, carrying a hod and doing odd jobs of plaster-
ing and kalsominlng.5
Besides these construction and house-keeping duties, the
Army had to protect itself with a system of routine interior
guard duty. It was expected to escort the mail to California,
to guard inspecting Congressmen, to explore areas where individ-
uals feared to go, to furnish a guard for the capital investments
of the nation's empire builders, to rescue settlers who were
careless enough to be picked up by wandering war parties, and it
was to be omnipresent enough to appear everywhere at one time
when hostiles were threatening. As if this were not enough, the
Army found it necessary to be its own transport agent. This in-
dispensable duty had not been provided for in the organization
tables and it was necessary to detail large numbers of troops as
teamsters, herders, and hostelers, often against their will, to
haul the Army's supplies across prairie and mountain." When the
occasion demanded and the requisite orders were issued, it was
to die cheerfully to teach the rod man the authority of the
Great White Father.
It was largely .- thankless monotonous routine that this
Army performed and one that few of its troopers understood as
they labored toward their paradoxical objectives of aiding in
| Bourke, op. clt. . 7.
° Secretary of War, Annual Report f 1875, 1:6.
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the process of civilizing the wild Indians and curbing his mur-
derous theiving tendencies with force of anas.
In the mind of the soldier the real paradox was the method
of achieving the above objectives. Like the policeman, his
primary duty was to punish crime, a much more difficult task than
taking forceful steps to prevent it. But the soldier was hampered
by the specter of a court-martial if he should shoot an Indian
under any circumstances.' He was under special oriers not to
fire on an Indian except by orders of a commissioned officer,
and that person was to request orders from his commander whenever
the situation would permit such action.** While the bewildered
and sorely-tried soldier did his best to comply with such orders,
the Indians enjoyed the situation to the fullest extent. The red
man happily assured the traders that he would not waste ammunition
on soldiers, he would "chase soldier and drive away with sticks. "9
There was another aspect to this problem other than the
paradoxes created by the confusion and red tape. There was the
problem of man-power; how many men were needed and how they should
be employed. Officers in the field ware convinced that the caval-
ry was the only arm of the service that could be used efficiently
to run down Indians. The very nature of the terrain required
constant mounted patrols of some sort, a duty that was perforce
' De B. Randolph Kelm, Sheridan's Troopers on the Border.
ft
(Philadelphia, c. lob1 ?), 58.
° Senate, Executive Document No. 33, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.
9 Keim, pp. clt. t 58.±0 Trobriand, op. cit.
, 55} Secretary of War, Annual Report .
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accepted and executed by the cavalry arm. But other arms of the
service were needed also. Infantry served as garrison detail for
the numerous posts scattered over the country, and troops of some
sort were needed to occupy the static defense system that was
used along the railroads, a system of dugouts that offered pro-
tection to a small number of men and wherein they were able to
hold off many times their own number and thus protect the road
beds.H Artillery troops were useful too, for nothing so dis-
concerted a charge of mounted warriors as bursting howitzer shells.*•
But what was needed and what was available were two different
things. Frontier commanders were constantly requesting additional
troops during the decade from the end of the Civil War to the
Little Big Horn. Colonel Carrington was sent into the Powder
River country in the summer of 1866 to establish a new military
district among the Sioux confederation and to build several new
posts with only eight companies of Infantry and they were composed
largely of recruits. To alleviate the situation as much as possible
he armed his regimental band with carbines. Later, in place of
the effective reinforcements of Cavalry which he urgently requested,
he received scattered detachments of mounted men armed with out-
moded weapons, carrying insufficient ammunition, and with no
military training. 13 At Fort Riley, in the same year, the post
adjutant, an officer of the Second Cavalry, had to refuse to fur-
11 Keim. op. cit. . 61.
~ Carrington, op. cit.
, 129.L3 Senate . Executive Document No. 33, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.
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nlsh details of men for urgently needed repairs on the post since
there were only 57 men present for duty.!1*
General Sherman reported in 1867 that there were only two
regiments of Cavalry available for field duty in the Division of
the Missouri, a fact that necessitated constant shifting of those
regiments over vast areas, movements that could be executed only
after the hostiles had made known the shift in their area of oper-
ations by some depredation.1? The fluidity of the situation and
the defensive role of the troops were simply more than the avail-
able men could handle. General Sheridan, when he took command
of the Department of the Missouri in I867, found his command to
consist of 2,600 men (more than half of them Infantry) scattered
among 26 posts. 16 In.l872, General Sheridan (then commanding the
Division of the Missouri) reported that his command was made up
of 22 regiments, two-thirds of these being Infantry, with which
he must garrison 72 posts.17 Captain King of the ?th Cavalry
(in I876) waxed sarcastic over the tardiness of Congress When
replacements and fillers for his regiment arrived after the
campaign was finished. 18
As for trained artillery-men, that arm of the service was
largely occupied in other areas of the nation. Such artillery
Yt Port Riley, Letters , letter dated March 18, 1866.
15 Secretary of War, "
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weapons as were used ag inst hostile Indians were served by
troops of other arms who had been trained In the barest rud-
iments of the art by their offleers.1^
This dearth of man-power was not due to lack of foresight
on the part of the military leaders but rather to the hasty
demobilization of the armed forces after the War Between the
States and the resulting necessity of complex reorganization
of the Army, and the persistent demands of Congress and the
Cabinet for economy and retrenchment in the expenditures of
the military service.20 Such economy gave the appeasers and
the idealistic humanitarians a free rein by default.
Life in the Service
If the command of the West posed certain paradoxes in
an abundance of objectives and a lack of means, the life of
the men engaged in that endeavor was not at all inconsistent
with Itself; it was uniformly hard and unrewarding.
The base of operations for each unit was glamorized by
the title of a Post, Camp, or Station with the name of some
hero of the late War attached as the denominating factor in
the bost Anglo-Saxon tradition. Hardly any of these were
fortified places but were built on the plan of a cantonment.
» Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier . (Now York,
„ c. 1928), 3h.
"*" Leroy R. Hafen and Francis Marion Young, Fort Larariio
and the Pageant of the West , (Glendale, Calif,, 1938),
3&5.
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When the site for a new post had been selected, troops would
move to the position and the building operation would be com-
menced by marking out that sanctified bit of earth called the
parade ground.21 Around this rectangular area the buildings
would be placed, officer's quarters on one side, troop bar-
racks immediately opposite, and the ends would be filled with
the buildings necessary to military operations, such as post
headquarters, storehouses, hospital, stables, and the guardhouse.22
Here in this tiny cluster of buildings would live the
troops who would one day win the Westj frequently there was
only a single company, occasionally there would be as many as
six or eight companies. 23 Around them would stretch the tossing
sea of grass or the curling crests of mountains reaching towards
infinity. Within the post the commandant, like a sea captain,
was a law unto himself 5 he ordered the dally life, watched the
execution of his commands, and served asmgh sort of justice to
all those who failed to comply to the rigid rules of military ser-
vice. Formal courtesy and rigid discipline were a matter of course}
the flag, the very heart of the garrison, received daily honors, 2^"
and the post commander sometimes ordered daily dress parades on
the hostile grass of the empty prairie. 2 '
21 Carrlngton, op. cit. t 106.
22 Elizabeth 3. Custer, Boots and Saddles . (New York, 1885),
„ 98-9.
5£ Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1866, 17.2£ Kelm, on. clt. . 59.2
-> Fort Hays, Kansas. Special Order Book
. October 15, 1866 -
May 26, 1868. Microfilm in Kansas Historical Association
Library Archives, Post Order Uo. 8, dated July 1, 1867,
Hereinafter cited as Fort Hays, Orders .
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The sense of isolation was rendered more complete by the
economizing practice of supplying many of the outposts with
nonperlshable supplies but once a year.26 Prom the post the
patrols and escorts moved out daily, scouting parties returned
with detailed reports of Indian movements and sketch maps
of the country they had traversed. Occasionally the post was
abuzz with activity over an inspection, or the arrival of a
supply train, or the departure of troops on a campaign. But
normally it drowsed and sweated in the summer sun, and in winter
it huddled itself together around rationed fires and waited for
spring. Shivered is perhaps a better word than huddled, at least
for the occupants, for most of the posts were cheaply built as
temporary posts.2?
The tar paper roofing would crack in the sun and leak in
the rain. 28 Where logs were used, those serving as found-
ations would rot and the entire building would sag until it
was hardly fit for men. Some rooms had nothing but thick paper
instead of plaster for walls.29 General Sherman lamented loudly
that troop barracks on the frontier were "in some places inferior
to what horses usually" had in Washington, D. C.30
26 House of Representatives , lixecutive Document No. 116. k2
-„ Cong., 3 Sess., I073. '
*L Secretary of .','ar, Anr-Jal flerjprt
. 1871, 1«36.
^o Fort Riley, Letters
,
Letter dated July 19, 1866.
%* E. B. Custer, Boots and Sadiles . 99.
i» Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1869, 1«31.
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Enlisted men who were married were oven more unfortunate,
for their housing was seldom provided due to lack of suffic-
ient appropriations for quarters, and such housing as they had
must therefore be constructed of borrowed government material
acquired after tatoo had been sounded.
3
1 These quarters were
frequently as improvised as the jungles of hobo-land, but
they served their purpose and officers ignored the means of
acquisition of material as an evil nutured by an unsympathetic
Congress.
Officers fared considerably better than the troops in
this respect, but even they were not coddled by the public
treasury. 32 spartan simplicity was expected of both officers
and their Indies on the frontier. Furnishings and decoration
for their shelters were personal problems and varied with the
ingenuity and the private purse of the individual. The pay
was insufficient to meet the cost of professional decorators,
had such been available, and the difficulties in transporting
such articles as furniture made such a choice a mere natter
of rhetoric.
Then there was the ancient and honorable custom of rank
that was certain to keep the matter of quarters in complete
confusion. The coming of a new officer to the post caused
a oomplete reshuffling of quarters as the rank of the new-
comer gave him an inviolable right to remove any officer who
31 Secretary of War, Annual Report f 187^-, Ii96, and 1875,
to 1*5»J" E. B. Custer, Boots and Saddles . 99.
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was his Junior In the service. The junior officer's compen-
sation was to remove his junior and so ad infinitum or until
the pack had been thoroughly mixed. But in spite of such
customs there was actually little choice in the matter. With
the exception of the commanding officer's residence, which was
usually larger than the others, the quarters were equally bad.
In view of the insufficient quarters and the unpredict-
able oliaate of the region it seems strange that the health
of the troops should be so uniformly good. 3ut the very occa-
sional remarks of the Surgeon-General's reports" and the reports
of some department commanders^4" Indicate that such was the case.
The out-door life, rugged and ready as it was, was sufficient
tonic for all ailments and the medical officers of the frontier
commands were more frequently treating wounds than disease.3'
Nevertheless, once the posts were completed, the medical
department took every precaution that was familiar to their
practice to prevent any epidemic of disease, 3° at least as far
as circumstances would permit. But the water supply proved a
constant problem that was nearly insolvable for the western
posts. The praotlce for many years was to take the post water
supply from whatever source was available and to distribute it
in barrels in a daily door to door delivery,37 a system that was
pregnant with possibilities for epidemic outbreaks.
33 Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1876, I1318.
1* Secretary of War, Annual Report
. I872, 1|I*3.
J> Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1876, I1318.
J? Port Hays, Orders, General Order No. 23, dated April 16, 1868.
J' Elizabeth B. Custer, Following the Juidon . (New York, 1890).
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In view of such difficulties it is not surprising that
cholera should sweep through these posts periodically as it
did through the posts in western Kansas in the summer of 1867.
Fort Harker first suffered this scourge and Mrs. Custer dra-
matically reported that saldiers died "by platoons."-* The
disease spread rapidly and Fort Hays was likewise afflicted.
At this post the difficulty in securing proper nursing for
the patients has been recorded. The commander made use of
volunteers who were serving sentence in the guardhouse as
nurses. He later granted them a pardon for their service, if
it would be approved by the Department Commander.
^
Another and more common scourge that reduced the totals
of men present for duty was the age-old military problem of
scurvy. The commanders on the frontier sought out and used
every measure possible to prevent or cure this disease. On
extended campaigns the entire command sought and ate wild
onions and wild fruits and berries.^ in garrison the appear-
ance of scurvy among the troops made antiscorbutics top priority
on transport 3 tion lists.^ Wherever possible, post vegetable
38 Elizabeth B. Custer, Tenting on the Plains . (New York,
,Q 1895), 381.J? Fort Hays, Orders . Post Order No. 15, dated July 22, 1867.
The pardon was later rescinded on the order of the De-
partment Commander and the men were returned to the
guard house to finish out their sentences in the Interest
of discipline. Fort Hays, Orders . Special Order No. 93,
Kg dated September 10, 1867.w Martin F. Schmltt (ed.), General Crook, his Autobiography.
., (Norman, 19>+6), 210. !— —K-UL'
*x Senate. Executive Document No. 33 f 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.
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gardens were planted and fresh vegetable were Issued to the
entire garrison. * But in those areas where gardens were im-
possible, fresh fatty meats were used as an effective substitute.
Jerky (meat dried in the sun with little or no salt) was sometimes
used as a preventive agent,^3 though its effectiveness has not
been recorded. Such versatile ef ."orts were not completely suc-
cessful^4, but scurvy was held in check sufficiently to prevent
wholesale casualities among the troops.
There were other more subtle problems facing the medical
officers on the frontier. During long campaigns some men suf-
fered from battle fatigue, an ailment if not a term well recog-
nized by the medical officers of the seventies. Those who could
not stand the nervous tension of Indian campaigning were examined
by the doctors and were removed from the war zone periodically
as transportation was available without detriment to the service. 1*^
These difficulties were the exception rather than the rule
on the frontier. Continuous inclement weather which caused rheu-
matism and kindred ills*6 and bad provisions1*''' or lack of any
provisions were probably the most pernicious threats to the health
of the men.
L.3
7* Fort ailey, Letters
. Letter dated August 15, 1867.
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The usual field ration of bacon, hardtack, sugar, and
coffee were insufficient in bulk and in calories, proteins,
and vitamins, a faot understood though not defined by field
commanders. It was common practice for a command to drive
a herd of beef cattle with the supply train to add to the
rations in the field. It was just as common for the Indians
to attempt to steal the herd, a deed they not infrequently
accomplished." The wagons also carried sacks of beans and
flour which were to be used to add bulk to the ration. The
beans were invariably baked in a dutch oven and the flour
was baked into an unleavened cake, dubbed "doble bread" by
the troops.* These delicacies, however, appeared only while
the troops were camped near the wagon trains and, since the
reconnaisance scouts were performed by H^tly equipped col-
umns, the wagon-train supplements were too infrequent to make
** Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1876, 1»93. The Army
Ration (Par. 1367, A. H., 1863.) (One ration is enough
food for one day for one man} in other words a ration
is three meals.) Twelve ounces of pork or bacon or
canned beef (fresh or corned,) or one pound and four
ounces of fresh beef, or twenty-two ounces of salt
beef j eighteen ounces of soft bread or flour, or six-
teen ounces of hard bread, or one pound and four ounces
of cornmeal; and to have, every one hundred rations,
fifteen pounds of pease or beans, or ten pounds of rice
or hominy; ten pounds of green coffee, or eight of
roasted (or roasted and ,^ound) coffee, or two pounds
of tea; fifteen pounds of sugar, four quarts of vine-
gar; four pounds of soap, four pounds of salt; four
ounces of pepper; one pound and eight ounces of adaman-
tine or star candles; and to troops in the field, when
necessary, four pounds of yeast-powder to one hundred
.
rations of flour. S. B. Custer, Guidon . 205, footnote.
"? Bourke, op. cit.. 256; Senate . Document No. 68, 73 Gong.,
_ 1 Sess., 1933.
->" W. 0. Wilkinson, Letter printed in Winners of the West.
17«8, February, 19*K>.
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up for dietary deficiencies. Even more debilitating than
this dietary deficiency, the economy of Washington, in the
early years of the decade, forced the Quartermaster to issue
rations that were six or seven years old and had been improper-
ly protected from the elements by lack of proper storehouses.
These rancid and moldy rations added materially to the prob-
lem of health on the frontier.?1
To the soldier's personal morale the coffee was the most
important item in the ration issue, and he, like his modern
counterpart in the last war, hoarded his supply carefully
and could never start out the day without a steaming black
cup full of this stimulant.'2 In bulk, however, hardtack actually
filled more stomachs than any other item. The trooper's in-
genuity in devising methods of reducing this cement-like square
of flour, salt, and water to an edible condition is amazing in
its variety and amusing in its defiance of the rules of cook-
ing. 53 Certainly the most unpopular item on the Subsistence
Department's shelves were the desiccated vegetables that were
sometimes issued in lieu of peas or beans. These lumps of dried
vegetable matter were partially Identifiable as cabbage, carrots,
turnips, parsnips, and onions. The residue was insoluable and
lnsolvable, but it came floating blithely into the stew without
invitation.'* of course, game was more or less plentiful and
•S B. B. Custer, Tenting,, 39U-.
^ John D. 3illings, Hardtack and Coffee
. (Minneapolis, 1888),
121.
^ IbldT
. 177.
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appeared on the mess fare when the situation permitted, and the
Subsistence stores provided some canned goods.'' In some areas
native fruits and berries were made up into jams and preserves,
though married men enjoyed these more than the men living in
barrack or bachelor quarters. ^°
Married men also escaped the indigestion that was in-
nocently encouraged in the company kitchens. Company cooks
were detailed by roster for ten day periods with no regard
for their culinary ability.''' In the field the troopers cooked
for themselves. Not infrequently their rations were reduced
to their worn-out cavalry horses,' or meat and Indian ponies
captured from hostiles.'^ in general, the rations were insuf-
ficient, poor in quality, lacking balance, and poorly prepared,
but men ate them over countless camp fires and moved on to new
duties and more food of the same kind.
Such a monotony of diet, duty, and companionship bore
harshly on the nerves, and only the strict discipline pre-
served the sanity of the men occupying the frontier garrisons
by demanding in plain terms the individual control of temper
and emotion. Condemned to poor food, worse quarters, exas-
perating formalities, and more time than they could use pro-
fitably, it was no small wonder that troops should engage.
'5 Frances M. A. Roe, Army Letters from an Officer's Wife .
-
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(Hew York, 1909), 27-«| Carrington. op. cit.
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in wild releases of nervous tension or that they should
welcome the hardships of campaigning. But such a general
picture is only half the story, for the Army that came to
build and garrison these outposts was, in spite of its
general similarities, made up of individuals, and they
added their personality to the spirit of the Army.
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CHAPTER IV
THE KSN
These soldiers are not nearly as nice as ane would suppose
them to be. when one seas them dressed up in their blue
uniforms with bright brass buttons. 1
Mrs. Frances itoe.
Any army has a oharactar that comes to it from its expe-
rience in war and peace. Its character is often preserved
in ballad and story, but its elements, the men, "enrich the
silence where the millions go."2 Nevertheless, armies are
composed of men who retain some individuality and who add
something to the army 1 * personality despite the leavening
influence of the discipline and training in the service.
This army, the Army of the Indian Wars, was a force filled
to the brim with individualism that ran the gamut from good
to evil, from nobility to cowardice. Its elements were an
incongruous medley of professional soldiers, "Galvanized
Yankees" (ex-Confederate soldiers), emigrants, the dregs of
the cities, and boys searching for the adventure of a distant
romantic place.
From this Army's inception there were professionals on the
muster rolls, men to whom the army was home,3 and in every draft
of reoruits others returned who had found the prosaic business
J fto^i gp. olt.. 5.
J
°1928)
I
2o£
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»
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world too dull after the excitement of war. There were
Southerners, too, men who had been economically and spirit-
ually ruined by the war and had enlisted in the Yankee army
to continue in the way of life they had learned so well.'
Not infrequently men who had fled their fatherland to escape
military duty enlisted in the service because there was no
other job open to them." Here they could learn a new language
and become imbued with a new way of life, for there was no
test of nationality in this army, only the desire to Join it
and the physical stamina to endure it.' Recruiting officers
seldom found more fruitful areas for their operations than the
slums of the cities where men were quite willing to accept
regular meals and drinking money in return for duties they could
frequently avoid." Others sought out the recruiting detachment
just one Jump ahead of officers of the law,9 while many looked
upon the army as free transportation to the mines of the Far
West. 10 In country towns, boys answered the call of flashing
uniforms and gold braid as readily in this period as they
have since armies began. There were other encouragements to
the better-reared class of men, but these emanated from the
10
k King, oPt cit t , 161 ff.
? S. B. Custer, Tenting., 398.
Frazier Hunt and Robert Hunt, I Fought with Ouster, the
7 Story of SerjeantJVindolph . (New York, 19^7), "+.
i Parker, op, clt.
. 17-B.
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financial panic of 1873 and not from the service,11 The Army
welcomed them all and wistfully watched Congress and hoped
for more and always more.
The Indian-fighting Army was a rough, hard-drinking outfit,
these recruits discovered, an outfit that fought boredom with
Plains whiskey and bare knuckles. It was a polyglot collection
of men from all over the world brought together for three to
five years and thrown into a savage, never-ending war. Citizens
of the United States made up a little more than fifty per cent
of the men enlisted in this ten year period.12 The other half
of the men were from all over the world, including three
Chinese and two Sandwich Islanders. The largest foreign min-
ority were the Irish, whose twenty per cent of the total en-
listments nobly carried the belligerent reputation of Ireland
to the depths of the American continent. Qermans, too, made
a sizeable minority that totaled an average of twelve per
cent of the rookies in the service. England, Austria,
Belgium, Russia, even Switzerland, and many other nations
contributed sons to the Frontier Army of America.
There were regiments of recently freed Negro slaves on
the border too, four regiments of Infantry and two regiments
of Cavalry. Official records are silent on the subject of
colored troops with the exception of the Surgeon-General whose
11 Nelson A. Miles, Serving the Republic f (New York, 1911),
12 ^*" House of Representatives. Miscellaneous Document No. 105,W Cong., 1 Sess., 1:'7&. All of the figures in this
paragraph come from this document.
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annual reports briefly Indicate that disease, wounds, and
mortality rates average nearly the same for colored troops
as for white troops.^ Beyond that, the policy of the Army
was complete equality. But in the service the situation was
not as tranquil as the records appear.
During the period of activation and training of the 10th
Cavalry at Fort Riley there was considerable unrest and distrust
along Officer's Row where the wives of the absent 7th Cavalry
were quartered. The Negro recruits were prone to practice
their marksmanship while on guard duty and during their lelsuro
hours by shooting at anything that suggested itself as a target}
a habit that frightened the women and forced them to remain
In their quarters constantly. The recruits proved to be quite
capable of devouring an entire ration in one meal, a habit
that resulted in considerable digestive trouble. This, added
to their slovenly personal hygiene, led to epidemic diseases,
and the garrison suffered small pox and measles in their turn
and had scurvy as a constant companion. To the eyes of the
observers the experiment seemed doomed to failure. The in-
experience of the white officers in dealing with Negroes re-
caiv2d most of the blame for that apparent failure. The sit-
uation rapidly came to a climax when the troops successfully
mutinied against their officers over a real or Imagined shortage
in the sugar ration. Since they remained unpunished for their
!3 Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1867-1876, "Surgeon-
General Report."
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outbreak, the entire garrison waited in abject fear for
another mutiny. From the field came a gallant rescue in
the person of Major Gibbs, acting executive officer of the
7th Cavalry. Major Gibbs took charge of the entire situation
and within a week had smoothed out many difficulties and in
time made the 10th Cavalry an efficient unit of trained soldiers.
Once the regiment had been whipped into shape, they took
a real pride in their abilities as soldiers, a pride that
was shared by their officers.*' This self-respect manifested
itself in the personal appearance of the colored troopers as
well as in their combat ability, a manifestation that was
notably lacking in their white brothers-in-arms.
Whatever their abilities a3 soldiers might have been,
there were several evidences of intoleration and a desire for
segregation in the white regiments that saw service with them.
Captain George Armas of the 10th Cavalry, in a report dated
Fort Dodge, Kansas, April 17, 1879, Implies discrimination
against his "Brunette" troopers by the refusal to properly
supply and re-equip his detachment after they had exhausted
their horses and worn out their clothing on an extended scout
lit.x E. B. Custer, Tenting . 320 ff. The observer of these events
is the wife of Lt. Col. G. A. Custer of Little Big Horn
fame. As a reporter of fact, I presume she is correct,
but her language is extremely dramatic. It is a matter
of record that the 10th Cavalry made quite a name for
itself in engagements and scouts that ran the gamut from
the rescue of Sandy Forsyth on the Arickaree to a share
_ - in the Yellowstone Campaign of 1876.
l? George A. Armes, Ups and Downs of an Army Qfrioer . (Wash-
,, ington, D. C, 1900), 29*+.10 R. H. McKay, Little P1113 . (Pittsburg, Kansas, 1918), ¥f-5.
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through rough country. 1'' Just a month earlier, troopers of
the 5th Cavalry, a white regiment, had quarrelled violently
with troopers of the Tenthj a quarrel near the post theater
that ended in an exchange of pistol shots. The Fifth was
then reported to be preparing a full-scale attack on the
camp of the colored troops, an attack which was fortunately
averted by prompt action on the part of the officers of both
18
regiments. At Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory, grumbling by
white troopers against serving on guard detail with colored
men and against being commanded by colored sergeants was
serious enough to force the post commander to impose strict
segregation in opposition to the protests of the officers of
the colored regiment. ^9
Uncle Sam's colored troopers soldiered well and bore
their share of monotonous guard duty and scouting details,
but they were never quite accepted by the white regiments,
except on the battlefield where a man's color faded under
the shadow of bullets and arrows.
The service, however, created a unique emotion in men.
Whatever their nationality, wherever they found themselves,
men developed an esprit de corps . It was an intangible
thing, difficult to locate or accurately describe. But until
it appears a military unit is little more than a bunch of
men held to a leader's bidding by superficial rules and reg-
ulations. When it did appear, the unit became a fighting
1 Armes, op. clt. . 293-6.
to Ibid. . 28B.7 Roe, op. clt. f 103.
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machine with but one emotion, a tremendous pride, and a
complete subjugation of the individual to the will of the
commander and the good of the unit. Normally the unit to
which the soldier attaches his affection is the regiment,
but the situation in the Indian Wars separated regiments
into their smallest basic units, the companies.20 For over
a year after its organization, the 7th Cavalry did not work
as a unit."- Most of the many garrisons scattered over the
Plains area were small one or two company posts.22 Only the
older posts near the Missouri Hiver were largo enough to
quarter half a regiment or more, posts such as Fort Riley and
Fort Leavenworth in Kansas or Fort Abraham Lincoln in the
Dakota Territory. Since the men served their enlistment with
a company unit, their loyalty and affootion were naturally
guided towards it.
This spirit was evidenced in many ways. In the field,
the troopers hoarded their equipment in order to present a
good company report at the end of the campaign. The company
with the gre test predatory ability was sure to report fewer
loses of such items as bridles, nose bags, lariats, and picket
pin£>. Other companies accordingly reported compensating
losses. 23
20 T?r>ttl after the period under study, basic administra-
tive units were called companies in the Cavalry and
Infantry arms. Not until later did Cavalry units become
troops.
5£ 0. A. Custer, op. cit. . 190.
£* Secretary of War. Annual Report . 1866, 17.d$ King, op. cit. . 15bl
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The affection of men for their comrades-in-arms is an
often told story. Out on the Western Plains the stories
mount to heroic proportions as men fought together in a war
where recovering the bodies of the dead, even in defeat, was
a point of honor." On the more humorous side, the unlucky
trooper whose horse gave out on the trail was permitted to
carry his saddle and equipment for a few miles while his
comrades offered him witty advice on his conduct and sol-
dierly bearing. But invariably someone would relieve the
waddling trooper of his burden (which would be placed on the
wagons) and everyone cheerfully swapped places with him In
turn.2 ? The return of a detachment from a scout would find
a carefully concealed anxiety for them evidenced by a hot
meal awaiting every man.
Other situations demonstrate this brotherly feeling even
more clearly. There are tales of entire companies leaving
camp after tatoo to clean out some gambling den where a
comrade had been fleeched by a card shark. Or stories of
troopers on pass in town suddenly leaving the bar in a jroup
on hearing that a soldier's horse had been stolen from the
hitch rack. The story usually ends in some civilian horse
thief being thoroughly frightened and promising to reform
2h This was one of the charges brought against Col. J. J.
Reynolds for his actions against Crazy Horses' band in
the Powder River area on March 17, I876. Bourke, 00. cit.
.
280. Later Bourke mentions a number of desertionslie^
cause the men would not serve under officers who had
abandoned their dead and wounded to the enemy, ibid. .
25 3?*
2g E. b. Custer, Tenting, 230-1.
Bourke, op. cii. . 281.
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hi3 way of living, at least where a soldier's property was
involved. '
The esprit de corns worked in a disciplinary fashion as
well as in a spirit of camaraderie. Not infrequently minor
infractions of social and military amenities would be cor-
rected without recourse to formal discipline. A recruit who
was so slovenly about bathing that he offended those sleeping
nearest him discovered a holy tradition of the service, the
forced bath. ° Replacing his lost epidermis once was usually
sufficient to convince a man of the healthfulness of oral
hygiene.
Thus men lived together, ate together, and worked together.
They also played together. Facilities for recreation were
naturally limited on the frontier. The "hurry up and wait"
method of the Army held men in a nervous tension that demanded
some outlet, while the never-ending hours of garrison duty made
boredom equal to the Indian in its deadliness. Card playing
whiled away many of these hours both in tent and barrack} 29
its more innocent form was whist, while poker, the favorite
during the War Between the States, occupied, and fleeched,
those with loose change and sporting blood. Gambling in all
its forms occupied so much attention that the Army's moralists
managed to outlaw the vice, ^° but according to the evidence of
f? E. a. Custer, Guidon . 155-8.
|I Ibld-t 312.
^ Bourke, pp. clt, . 298.JU Senate
. Report No. 638, h6 Cong., 2 Sess., 1880.
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court-martial records this proved to be no deterrent to the
gamblers.*1
However, whiskey probably affected more of the men than
gambling. Some believed the desire to drink was one of the
most compelling reasons for enlisting in this Army. Here a
man could go on a periodic bout with bacchus with the know-
ledge that he would not suffer any social stigma from his
spree. His punishment would be a short sentence in the
guard house after which he would return to duty in the same
status as any other man. True, his pay was so small that
one month's wages were insufficient to finance a drinking
party, but payday came irregularly and the total might make
a considerable sum. Also, the retailer of Plains whiskey
realized the financial condition of many of his customers
and he made the price low enough to reach any man's purse,
Kvery barrel of whiskey received from the States was diluted
to make a volume of two to four barrels. This mildly flavored
liquor was then thoroughly laced with some concoction that
disguised the water and improved the intoxicating qualities
of the stuff. The resulting "red eye" was enough to put the
toughest trooper under the table.
3
2 This vice seemed to be
prevalent in every regiment from the 7th Cavalry, which
gained an early reputation^ and satisfactorily maintained
it through the years,
3
1
* to the 5th Infantry which had the
|1 Priest, op. cit. . 2?.
3% K. B. Custer, Tenting
. 373.
\l |M<Ll, 250-1.J* Scott, op. cit. . h2.
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best record for discipline of any regiment in the service. 35
Wherever and whenever the pay master made his infrequent calls,
military routines became a farce for a few days and the gar-
rison's energies were absorbed by alcohol and brawls in the
gin mills near the reservation. 3° As much as ten per cent of
a command would end their orgy in the guardhouse for a period
of recuperation. 37
There were various attempts made at controlling this
ancient tradition with varying degrees of success. Some
commanders forbid liquor on the reservation, but the thirsty
soldier and the saloon keeper both knew the precise limits
of that area. Patrols of soldiers could arrest troopers who
were caught in the gin mills but the civilian operator was
free to do as he pleased. A more successful method was to
allow the post sutler to sell whiskey but to limit the number
of drinks sold to any one person.3°
The post sutler figured largely in the recreation of
both officers and men. His establishment was a combined
officer's club, post exchange, recreation room for all ranks,
grocery store, bank, billiard parlor, and saloon.^? This
worthy institution was abolished in 1867 and its functions
were in part assumed by the Commissary Department. "+ But
I? Miles, Personal Recollections . 232.
^2 E. B. Ouster, Guidon, 2t36.
J< Parker, op. cit. . lb-7.
ForL5ays » Qrder9 ' Special Order No. 3, dated October 27,
,_ 1866.
P? Parker, op. cit. . 31.w Fort Riley. LetTers . letter dated June 10, 1867.
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this legal change aroused suoh a storm of protest that a
substitute was found, the post trader. 1*1 In actuality the
exchange was little more than verbiage since the post trader
assumed the same place in the soldier's life as his predeces-
sor, the sutler.
Of course, the troops could and did amuse themselves with
some sort of hunting or fishing, either for big game or small
game, game fish or pan fish, all of which provided a welcome
supplement to the monotonous rations as well as amusement.
Much of this sport was Impromptu and individual but occasion-
ally a commander offered his men both amusement and training
by an organized buffalo hunt.^-2 The propensity of the Indians
for attacking small parties was the one serious restriction on
this mode of recreation. On those occasions when the hostiles
were most active in the area near a post, aspiring nimrods were
required to ask the commanding officer's permission before leav-
ing on a hunting expedition.^3
Post comnanders felt the need for recreation and social
life for the men as keenly as their more modern counterparts.
They assisted as much as they could by having post theaters
constructed from whatever materials were available and by en-
couraging amateur theatricals. Clog dancers, accordionists,
and fiddle players of no mean talent would combine with amateur
X Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1867, 11.
7f 0. A. Custer, op. cit. f 69.
J? Port Hays, Orders . Post Order No. 3, dated June 23, 1867.
^* E. 3. Custer, Boots and Saddles
. 101.
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comedians to provide the entire garrison with an evening of
hilarious entertainment.^' Even on campaigns the command
would be beguiled by irrepressible musicians who would smuggle
their instruments in a wagon of the supply train.^° Regimental
bands added professional performances in evening concerts, ^7
and on one occasion a regimental band led troops into battle
with their music.
™
The same band provided the music for the series of company
dances that some regiments traditionally held each year. These
proved to be gala affairs shared by the enlisted men with the
officers and their ladies. The evening was rife with competition
as each company tried to out-do the others in decorations and in
the supper after the dance. The wise commanding officer would
delight his men and become human for a moment. He would gorge
himself on the food and satiate his uen with his obvious and
spoken pleasure.*9
Such instances were rare indeed, for the enlisted men and
officers were rigidly separated by formality and tradition.
Generally the men held their officers in awesome reverence,
never speaking unless invited and then in the strange language
of the third person that the army had devised. This separation
served its purpose in the maintenance of discipline; officers
and men knew their Job and each knew their place in the order
}*£ E. B. Custer, Guidon . 77.
K Ibid,., 77-8
7J.
King, op. cit. . 5.
7? Vestal72££_££L., 155.
^* E. B. Custer, Boots and Saddles . 101*.
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of things. But the rugged stamp of individualism and the adapt-
ability of the trooper knew no bounds beyond those set up by
military tradition, and the evidence of his handiwork is to be
seen In every corner of the West.
"•7
CHAPTER V
THE LEADERS
The want of discipline was not in the soldiers ... it was
in officers coming fresh to the command who were unequal to
the wiles of Indians, and despised ... caution.1
Colonel H. B. Carrington, Commanding 18th United States Infantry.
The Officer Corps
Authority, discipline, and training in the United States
Army is premised on a unique assumption. In the armies of
Europe the officer is a leader in battle, a planner of stra-
tegy and tactics, while the responsibility for training and
discipline devolves upon the noncommissioned officer. But
tradition in the American Army relieves the enlisted grades
of all responsibility, while the officer leads, commands, and
trains his men. Due to this situation, the ability and ef-
ficiency of the American Army depends directly on the officer
corps. The officer, of course, enjoys certain privileges as
compensation for this acceptance of responsibility. These
privileges are broadly lumped into one premise, the officer is
accountable for his own actions. For instance, the officer
who paid his initial call on Mrs. Custer while in a drunken
condition realized the rashness of his act and wisely resigned
his commission. Had he not resigned, he would surely have been
court-martlalled and cashiered out of the service for conduct
1 Senate
. Executive Document No. 33i 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.
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unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. There were, under such
a system, no prerequisites for a commission, and the result was
many political appointments without regard to the appointee's
ability, especially in the organization of the new regiments in
1866.3 Many officers in this new army were from the regiments
of volunteers that had been recently demobilized. This group,
probably the majority of the officers of the new regular army,
had no idea of the discipline or customs of the service and
were thereby handicapped by their approach to the peace-time
armyA Some men were commissioned from the ranks and these,
though frequently efficient officers, had difficulty in surmount-
ing the caste barriers of a group entirely surrounded by reserved
emotions and hoary custom.'
As a rule, in the cavalry arm, the company officers were
not thorough horsemen, a situation that caused a decrease in
the efficiency of that arm. In fact, some of the new officers
had to learn to ride after Joining their regiment, an educative
program that provided much amusement to the onlookers (and a
basket of champagne for every fall),? but boded ill for men led
into battle by these neophytes of Mars.
One result of this rather haphazard selection of officers
was an enormous number of courts-martial. These officers lacked
? E. B. Custer, Tenting . 257.
3 Ibid,, 262.
* ibfat. 237.
I itbid. t 262.
£ King!
'
op. cit. f 156-7.
» 3. B. Custer, Tenting . 265.
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the necessary experience to hold the respect and maintain the
discipline of a group of men without invoking the aid of military
courts to enforce their decisions. The scattering of regiments
to company posts threw the task of molding and holding the dis-
cipline of the Army on the shoulders of those least prepared
to execute the task." The fact that the majority of the officers
were probably veterans of the school of war was more of a lia-
bility than an asset. They felt superior to any study of tactics
or leadership and their ideas infected the whole corps of of-
ficers with a disdain for books^ and promoted the loose easy-
going discipline so prevalent in volunteer armies and so detri-
mental to professional soldiers in a peace-time army.
The system of promotion and retirement also added to the
inertia and the inefficiency of the officer corps in the first
years after the war. At the end of the first decade after 1866,
the officer corps was still filled with veterans of the War
Between the States. Gray-haired lieutenants were nothing un-
usual in the Indian-fighting Army. One retired at 64-, still a
first lieutenant. 10 The rigidity of the system of advancement
was fixed by law and it was one of the greatest weaknesses of
the Army. The retirement list was limited to seven per cent
of the strength of the officer corps. 11 Thus officers who had
£ Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1868, 61.
I Parker, op. cit.. 23.
f-" Downey, op. clt. f 21.
"• Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1869, 1:27.
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reached the age where they oould no longer perform their duties
had to be retained on the active list, even though absent from
the regiment, or ungraciously dismissed from the service. Heed-
less to say, they were retained, thus completely blocking the
system of promotion. Furthermore, the grades of captain and
below were promoted within the officer's regiment; a system
that had the merit of building the feeling and pride in the
unit, but whose value cannot be fully realized when the chances
for advancement are so completely retarded.12 Above the rank
of captain, promotion was entirely based on the individual's
grade and seniority on the list of officers of his grade in
the entire army without regard for ability or for total length
of service. Promotion depended on the death, dismissal, resig-
nation, or retirement of the ranking officers of the Army.^
Whatever merits could be found in this system were com-
pletely overbalanced by its debilitating effects. There was
no inducement for an officer to become efficient in his pro-
fession. Present for duty and the absence of court-martial pro-
ceedings on his record were all that were necessary to insure
his advancement, if he could only muster sufficient patience.
Marshalling sufficient patience to remain in grade 12 to 20
years was a difficult task. Since the study of war was out of
fashion, the officer had many hours of idleness vhi.\f fcj V3"
in garrison. There was much guard duty to be done, but drill
12 Parker, op. olt. . >+7.
13 E. B. Custer, Guidon
, 282.
of any sort was either short or nonexistent. Captain John
Bourke told of the endless monotony of the daily routine in a
single paragraph!
Guard mounting took place either before or after
breakfast, according to season, and then followed the
routine of tho dayi inspecting the men's mess at break-
fast, dinner, and supper} a small amount of drill,
afternoon stables, dress or undress parade at retreat
or sundown, and such other occupation as might suggest
itself in the usual visit to the herd to see that the
pasturage selected was good, and that the guards were
vigilant; some absolution in the recording of the
proceedings of garrison courts-martial and boards of
survey, and then g eneral ennui , unless the individual
possessed enough force to make work for himself. 14.
The types of work that men made for themselves was
varied enough, but the number of men that tried to w>rk were
comparatively few. Some officers studied foreign language,
mineralogy, botany, history, constitutional or international
law, and literature, the choice depending on individual taste
and the material available for study. Hunting was a relax-
ation when It could be classified as sport and not a foolish-
ly accepted chance,1' aut the temptations of cards, billiards,
and liquor attracted many who succumbed to ennui, Ranking
officers frequently intimidated younger men to gamble at
cards far beyond the limit of their pay.1^ Hard drinking,
too, was attractive in the eyes of many man in their seeking
to escape from inescapable monotony. All of which detracted
from their efficiency if not from their chances of promotion.
j-j Bourke. op. cit. . 12,
\2 Loc. cit.io Senate
. Report No. 638, 1+6 Cong., 2 Sess., 1880.
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To escape all of this was practically Impossible. Offi-
cers stayed with the same regiment through most of their
career, and the high cost of transportation prevented any
periodic shifting of regiments, had that been desirable.
Extended leaves of absence were out of the question, even for
those who had served several years without leave. An officer
was allowed 30 days leave per year and any authorized absence
beyond that length of time was taken at half pay. Furthermore,
there was no provision for accumulation of leave time. When
the travel time necessary to reach the states from an isolated
outpost was subtracted from the 30 days, there was little or
no time to enjoy the leave.1 '' Since most officers, especially
of the lower grades, could not afford even a month at half pay,
they were, in actual practice, confined to the West without any
prospect of a break for many years at a time. The only real
means of reaching home was to bring home to the Army, and many
officers took their wives to the farthest outposts for that
reason. In some Instances the government strongly encouraged
this practice.1"
17 House of Representatives . Executive Document No. 155,
M-3 Cong., 1 Sess., 1B74-. Later in this year the law was
changed to give an officer sixty days leave without
reduction in pay. Secretary of War, Annual Report
,
- 137^, Ijxxv.
10 Vestal, op. cit. . 93.
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The Women
The encouragement offered to married officers by the
government appeared only in the paper directives because
that same government thought very little of making the quar-
ters on the frontier posts attractive to women. This was
sufficient encouragement for any army wife. They took the
poorly built quarters in stride} they papered the walls with
illustrations from Harper's 3azaar and grew indigenous vining
plants to cover the walls of some rooms. They allowed their
imagination free rein in devising ingenuous means to add to the
comfort and beauty of their homes. They planted gardens, nursed
them through the early growth, then, more often than not, moved
to another post before they could enjoy the fruit of their
effort. They were angry with the Army and with the Indians
when conditions forced them to return Bast. The least pos-
sibility of rejoining their husbands saw them braving the
rattling day coaches, the indigestible food, and vermin-ridden
lodgings of the railroad taverns to get back to the dangers,
joys, sorrows, and discomforts of some outpost on the Great
Plains. The chance remark that the amy wife seemed to marry
only for love evoked the now classic outburst, "Good heavensl
What else could she marry for?"1? And there seemed, indeed,
little else.
19 E. B. Custer, Guidon . 282. All three of ilrs. Custer's
books present excellent and humourous accounts of
army wive 3.
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Their position In the post family was tenuous at best,
and they, like everyone else, wore under the orders of the
post commander and subject to discipline by him. Not that
the Aray wa» vise enough to provide for their control by
specific regulations, but commanding officers customarily
and humourously usod the Army Hegulation pertaining to camp
followers as a legal control over the wives of offioar3.ao
Army women had a choice field for the exercise of indus-
trial pursuits and many learned for the first time what was
done in the kitchen and the sewing room.2 *" Lack of servants
drew no apology from harrassed Army wives* Those persons
entioed away from the relative luxury of the East to serve
in the household of an army officer in the tfost soon learned
their high value as laundresses and the fortunes that could
be made by selling pies to enlisted men. They soon became
haughty and disputant and would finally quit their Job as
a domestic and launch a private enterprise in marriage and
bad cooking. Shops were simply not available, to furnish the
clothing needed by a growing family. The only alternative
was hand sewing, and patterns, fashion magazines, and flying
needles set the pace for the social life of the genteel woman
and promoted the pioneer institution, the sewing bee. Preparing
meals, too was a difficult problem. The ordinary army ration,
purchased from the Commissary Department, was the staple in the
20
21 5# BT Custer » -i>9tf and aa mes, 129-30.«=* Carrington, op. clt^ 17V».
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family larder. About the only addition to that palate-dulling
food was ingenuity, and experienced army wives could make
tempting dishes from almost nothing. 22 The winds of the
prairie, too, were misohievous and troublesome to the woman
living in a frontier post. Long skirts and playful gales re-
vealed many a pretty ankle and reddened many a gentle face
until some woman hit upon the idea of lead slugs sewed into
the hems of skirts. The additional weight was adequately
compensated by the feeling of propriety,23 The danger from
Indian outbreaks did not pass them by any more than the winds,
and, once the children were accounted for, women did their
share of the watching whenever an alarm was sounded.2^
The terror these women suffered during the tour of duty
in the West can be easily imagined. The personal danger was
sufficient to discourage less hardy souls. However, the
lonely fear that filled their hearts at parting with their
men was stifling in its hot rush, and it remained until the
happy day when the outfit would return from its excursion
into the unknown. The traditional "Girl I Left Behind Me,"
played by the band as troopers left garrison, was a sharp
discord of panic and dread in the ears of these women. The
constant companionship with fear made them a Gregarious lot,
generous to a fault, and always willing to avoid a quarrel
while their men were absent.25
22
p. Hoe, op. olt. . 27.
*£ E. B. Custer, Tenting. 256.
f* Carrington, op. cit, t 158.£? E. B. Custer, Boots and Sad lies . 188.
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It was In this ever-present fear that the wives of officers
and enlisted men felt their only kinship. Always separated
by a social barrier if not by a legal barrier, they nevertheless
sufrered kindred emotions that tended to temporarily hrsach
the customs of the service. But at that point, all similarity
and contact ceased. Whereas marriage of officers was tacitly
provided for by the allowance of quarters and rations, the
marriage of enlisted men was regulated by law and every dis-
couragement to such action was presented. A soldier was required
to ask permission of his commanding officer before marrying.
The number of married enlisted men on the post was to be limited
to four per company and their wives were to be employed as
laundresses for the command. A3 laundresses they then became
eligible to receive one ration and such quarters as could be
26provided.
In spite of such regulations, the number of shacks in
"Suds How" often exceeded the total allowed by the tables of
organization.2 ' The hardship and poverty of the inhabitants of
"Suds Row" was the subject of many regulatory attempts. But
regulation and law have never solved social problems unless
the people who came under their enforcement were convinced of
the need for them, in the army or in any other part of thepjp-
ulation. The army people helped each other to enjoy their chosen
life as much as the circumstances would allow and politely
ignored all such regulations.
2° Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1875, It 6.
*< Secretary of War, Annual Report . l87*f, Ii96.
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CHAPTER VI
THE NOVICES
He who sets his foot in the stirrup must mount to the saddle.1
Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker.
Review of the General Factors of the Military Problem
The birth pains of this Indian-fighting Army were long and
enduring. The fundamental problems that face any army in its
struggle to become a fighting machine were intensified in the
Great Plains area of the United States. These problems can be
broadly classified as personnel, supply, geographic, and admin-
istrative, and to all these family troubles must be added the
enemy.
The men that enlisted in the Regular Army were not the
highest caliber men} they were the floating debris of a nation
Just emerging from a long war. Furthermore, they were not
awakened to any sense of duty or encouraged to become profes-
sional soldiers by the living conditions that they experienced
on the frontier. The temporary quarters soon became unfit for
habitation because of lack of funds to make necessary repairs.
Spoiled rations and epidemic diseases frightened many men into
risking punishment for desertion. Poorly-made uniforms added
nothing to their pride in the service nor did those uniforms
protect a man from the savage weather of the prairies and
mountains. The isolation of the garrisons of the West settled
like a deadly pall on men's minds and their hardest struggles
1 Harold Lamb, Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker. (Garden City.
New York, c. 1538), 167.
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were controlling their own passions and combating the dreadful
lethargy produced by idleness. Neither soldier nor officer
adequately understood the division of duties between the Army
and the Indian Bureau. Administratively the Army was stationed
in these outposts of civilization to preserve the pe-.ce and to
protect property, yet the Indian considered the soldier fair
game at all times. The orders of the Army prevented any offen-
sive action by any troop leader without directions from the
Indian Buroau and the illusion of peace was enhanced by the
presence of women and children on every post. But troopers
were in the saddle at daybreak prepared to beat off an attack
every day they were in the field.
The high command was aware of most of these problems and
it w orked assiduously toward their solution. Health problems
were largely solved in the first five years of the decade. The
food was improved in quality if not in quantity and the suit-
ability of the uniform was taken under study. The quality of
the enlisted men continued to plague field commanders through-
out the period but tradition slowly began to accumulate around
certain heroes and a feeling of unity within the outfits began
to increase.
Paradoxically, these same troublesome factors were instru-
mental in eventually molding this Army into a powerful military
force. Whatever difficult problems the enemy, the terrain, the
lack of troops, and logistics imposed on these soldiers, those
same things forced young officers to accept oomplete responsibility.
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The whip lash of necessity drove them to discipline, train,
and lead their men into battle in the face of overwhelming
odds, and to emerge victorious and capable leaders.
The inherent, variagated conflicts of this story must
be brought into proper chronological order before the wlll-o-
the-wisp cause-effect relationships that the twentieth-century
mind so avidly seeks can be discovered.
The decade under consideration opened with the hasty
demobilization of the army after the War Between the States.
The year 1866 found the Army struggling through a reorganiza-
tion that practically amounted to a reconstitution of the armed
forces of the nation.2 In the midst of this reorganization
the Army undertook to chastise the red men for a series of
depredations through extensive campaigns in both the Department
of the Missouri and the Department of the Platte. This oper-
ation failed completely. Both commands were defeated by lack
of troops and supplies before they took the field. The chief
result of the whole affair was the arousing of the anger of all
the Indian tribes of the Plains and an increase in the depred-
ations of war parties.
Here, in brief form, was the situation on the Western
Frontier in 1866. The clue to the fluctuations of the efficiency
of the United States Army during the next ten years can be seen
in the numbers of men recruited each year to maintain the armed
forces at their authorized strength.
2 Hafen, o--„ clt. . 337.
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In 1866, the recruiting service enlisted more than 38»OO0
men to re-establish the Regular Army.3 The following year
Congress authorized the establishment of several new regi-
ments which the recruiting service struggled to fill. But
the 31,980 recruits sent out to the line regiments were thou-
sands more than were needed for the authorized expansion.
However, there were 10,000 desertions during the year, indi-
cating an extremely low morale in the service. 4' This high
rate of recruiting continued in 1868 and It Jumped upward
again the next year. The peak of the recruiting, however,
came in 1871 when 21,567 men were enlisted, despite no Increase
in the numerical strength of the Army. The corresponding low
ebb In morale was attributed by contemporary officers of the
army to the reduction of the pay scale of the enlisted men.
The next year, an alarmed Congress passed a new pay bill which
as lured the soldier a lump sum of money to be received from
the paymaster upon completion of the first term of honorable
service. The desired effect was achieved in time; during the
next two years it was only necessary to enlist 12,000 new men
per year. The continued decline in desertions and the increase
in re-enllstnients was indicative of an increase in the morale
of the armed forces, though part of the drop In recruiting in
1873 can no loubt be traced to the financial panic of that
3 House of Representatives . Miscellaneous Document No. 105,
'rt- Cong., 1 Sess., 137b. All figures in this paragraph
,
that concern recruiting are from this document.
* Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1875, lil6>f.
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year. However, In 187^ only *f,821 men were recruited. This
figure can be simply explained by the fact that Congress
ordered the reduction of the strength of the army from 30,000
to 25,000 men.
This graphic illustration of the disaffections of the
soldiers of the Regular Army during this decade is striking.
Just as the need for large numbers of recruits in the years
1867 and 1868 vividly points out the effect of bad rations
and epidemic disease on the morale of the soldiers, so the
other fluctuations in recruiting illustrate the tensions in
discipline and morale that Influenced the efficiency of the
Indian-fighting Army as a military force.
Further consideration of the development of the charact-
er of this Army can best be seen in a chronological develop-
ment that will permit a more detailed examination of those
difficulties that required several years for their solution.
In this exposition it will be convenient to divide the material
into three periods. The first period falls naturally in the
years 1866 to 1868, the period of reorganization of the Army
until Sheridan began formulating his plans for a winter campaign
against the Southern Tribes. The second period will describe
Sheridan's efforts and carry the development to the Black Hills
Exploration In 187^. The third period will then cover t hose
restless years of tension that closed the decade (I87I+-1876)
and resulted in the final defeat of all the Plains Indian Tribes.
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From Nothing to the Washita, 1866 - 1868
With its usual genius for understatement, the War Depart-
ment reported in 1866 that there were a large number of de-
sertions, "from various causes arising out of the unsettled
state of the army."' in the lower echelons of the hierachy,
there were more blunt statements of the situations. One of-
ficer ordered a new lock placed on the stables since he had
insufficient men to mount a 2k hour guard over the horses ~
and could not trust the men if he had them.^ These first
years of reorganization were almost too much for the recruiting
service, since desertions thinned the ranks as rapidly as they
could be filled. Inasmuch as the pay scale of the army was
still based on the high scale established during the War (516.00
per month for privates), 7 there appeared to be no reason for
the many desertions on that score. The paymasters paid most
of the garrisons regularly$ the exceptions being those posts
where travel consumed ho to 70 days for the round trip.** Sup-
plies of clothing and equipment, too, were sufficient since enor-
mous amounts of uniforms, blankets, tentage, etc., were on hand9
in supply depots relatively near most of the garrisons^ There
seemed to be little material reason for the state of morale in
the service in 1866.
I Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1866, 83.
7 Fort Riley, Letters, letter dated July 23, 1866.
X Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1871, lt73.
q Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1868, 179.
? Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1867, 207iu Secretary of War, Annual ReporT' 1868, 165.
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The "various causes" so artfully avoided by the War
Department were to be found outside the service. Unit com-
manders were constantly plagued by the desertions. They were
wondering if they would command enough men to put their regi-
ment in the field against the Indians. One com ;ander, in
searching for causes for this epidemic, opined that the high
wages offered men as laborers in the mines and the lightness
of the maximum sentence for the crime of desertion (six months
at hard labor) combined to make enlisted men consider the risk
of being caught and punished as trivial when compared to their
reward should they succeed in deserting.11 There was a total
lack of pride in the unit or loyalty toward the service in
this new Army. The medley of men drawn together in these
garrisons was not bound by any emotional purpose} their only
reasons for enlisting, as in all professional armies, were
personal.
The ordnance of this new Army, like its clothing and
equipment, came largely from surplus stock piles. The Cav-
alry and some light Infantry units were supplied with avail-
able breech-loading carbines of various patterns. But the
bulk of the troops, the Infantry, still carried a miscella-
neous collection of rifled muzzle-loading weapons. Plans
were being made to convert the standard Springfield rifle-
musket into a breech-loader,12 but a year was to pass and
12 o
0rt ?lley » Letters, letter dated February 13. 1867." Secretary offer, Annual Heoort . 1866, 5. '
G+
many men were to die before this modern weapon would be in
the hands of the troops.
The lesson that was driven into the military mind at
the first battle of Bull Run had long since been lost. Men
were still not trained before they w>re assigned to units.
Even those that remained in the recruiting depot six weeks
learned little more than dismounted drill and "how to groom
a horse in regulation style."13 Again and again field com-
manders remarked on recruits being assigned to the companies
without the most rudimentary knowledge of soldiering. These
same men w re assigned to duty "as arduous and hazardous as
in time of war" 14, but a multitude of duties occupied so much
of their time that they could not be instructed in marksman-
ship, or even in the loading of their assigned weapon. Further-
more, the tables of organization made no provision for the
assignment of company-grade officers to such necessary duties
as staff duty and recruiting service. This situation
frequently left only one officer on duty with the company,
and his time would be so taken up with scouting, escorting,
and other duties that he had little time to train his men.1^
The result ttt all this was that units were composed almost entire-
ly of recruits. These men would take the field, even after one
or two years service, with little or no instruction in the exer-
cise of the individual soldier in battle.
E
*,nA B-?
ri
«inst0°1 ' I ?roo°er with Custer . (Columbus, Ohio,
.. 192?), 20. ' »
±Z Secretary of War, Annual Report . I873, ls88.
Log, clt.
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Such, than, was the situation in general during the
early years of the decade. The new Army lacked any esprit
de corps, and its men, though initially supplied and equipped
adequately, were armed with a variety of obsolete weapons
and assigned to regular duty with no training. Superhuman
efforts would be required to accomplish anything with such a
force. Yet the most important expedition sent out in the
year 1866 suffered from most of these faults and from others
even more glaring and detrimental to its success.
On May 19, 1866, Colonel H. B. Carrington marched toward
the Sioux" s favorite hunting ground, the Powder River area,
with orders to establish posts and protect the Bozeman Trail
for emigrant travel. His force consisted of the Second
Battalion of the 18th Infantry, about 800 men, of whoa 511
were recruits who had not been with the organization a week.16
This force marched into a country where 3,000 cavalrymen led
by General Connor had been badly defeated only one year
before. 17 As the unit approached hostile country, the com-
mander became acutely aware of the deficiency of the army
transport system. At Fort Laramie, where the 18th Infantry
expected to receive sufficient supplies of ammunition and
rations to carry them through most of the summer, thoy found
only four day's supply of deteriorated hardtack and no uten-
sils to bake bread to make up for the deficiency. Moreover,
16 Senate
,
Executive Document No. 33, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.*' vestal, op. cit.
T 92. ' ' *
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they secured only 1,000 rounds of ammunition of the proper
oaliber for their antiquated rifle-muskets. 1**
In the true Army tradition, the 18th Infantry moved on
into the Powder River country and began building the posts
as they had been ordered to do. The enormous task of con-
struction, as well as carrying dispatches and escorting
emigrants and supply trains, fell, as usual, to the soldiers.
Red Cloud and his Sioux warriors, in a very un-Indian fashion,
kept up continuous skirmishes and attacks on every detail
of men that ventured outside the post. His persistence in
theso tactics amounted to a virtual state of seige for the
garrison.
The supply and man-power situation did not improve for
the white men. Ammunition supplies were reduced to practic-
ally nothing,1? there were insufficient officers to direct
and control the command, and the laboring troops had no time
to become acquainted with their profession as soldiers.
Colonel Carrington's urgent requests for a unit of
Cavalry to aid his mounted Infantry ware stingily answered by
scattered detachments armed with a variety of weapons coming
to Port Phil Kearny as escorts for trains. Other detachments
slowly arrived, but their value was not enhanced b the fact
that they had never been instructed in military procedures,
i8 Senate, Executive Document No. 33, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.
±7 Amounts of ammunition available at one time wore; Fort
C. F. Smith, ten rounls per man; Port Phil Kearny, forty-five rounds per man; Fort Reno, thirty rounds per man.
0. A. Custer, op. cit. t 115.
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even in such rudimentary movements as mounting a
horse.20
Quartermaster clothing, too, proved to be insufficient
and inadequate as the cold winter of Wyoming closed in about
these isolated troops. It became necessary to abandon any
idea of uniform dress and allow the men to suit themselves.
The resulting costumes of wolf skin caps, buffalo-hide boots,
and bear skin overcoats wore wierd uniforms for organized
troops even though they proved effective protection against
the cold.21
Training in the business of being a soldier depended on
the energy of the company officers, and it was confined to
moments of drill at retreat formation where they were instructed
in firing in volleys by squads. But such training had little
effect since, in battle, the officers sometimes ordered fire
at extreme ranges; on one occasion revolvers were fired at
several hundred yards range, a ridiculous effort, but one
ordered by a commissioned officer.22 3y fall, however, officers
and men were slowly learning to reserve their fire and to
handle their weapons with some effectiveness, largely as a
result of daily intimate contact with hostiles.
In spite of these difficulties, the very things that
enhanced them — the isolation, the daily skirmishing, and
the construction work ~ helped to mold an esprit de corns
and strengthen the feeling of discipline in the command.
20 Senate,, Executive Document No. 33, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.
%% Carrington, op. clt„ 213-3.
" Senate. Executive Document No. 33, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., 1887.
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The necessity of depending on the individual's mechanical
skill during the building of the post tended to undermine
the traditional obedience to orders of non-commissioned
officers. Nevertheless, there was no serious grumbling,
little drunkeness, constant willingness to approach any
task, and alertness to the dangers of the situation.
Yet the Indians won the final decision in this attempt
of the white man to open up new territory. The lack of
man-power, modern ordnance, ammunition, and proper equipment
to face the northern climate, coupled with the constant
pressure by the Indians and the disastrous Fetterman Massacre,23
caused the Army to order the abandonment of the area and the
closing of the Bozeman Trail.
In the early spring of 1867, the Ordnance Department
began to issue the converted Springfield rifle-musket to
infantry troops in the Division of the Missouri,2h ^3 by
July of that year nearly all of the Infantry stationed in
that military division were armed with the new breech-loading
rifle. 5 immediate reports from the field were enthusiastic.
Both the rifle and its ammunitiin were considered the final word
in infantry small-arms by the field commanders.26 Now the Army
began thinking about standardizing all the small-arms of the
23
°n
n,»r,?
b9r 21
»
1866, Brevet Lt. Col. Fetterman and eightymen were wiped out by the Sioux when the Colonel dis-obeyed the orders of his commanding officer and attackedL^f*?* f°^e °£ hostU°si an attack that was umec-pJSSL^w th9,-obJ e°tive, relief of a wood train, was2h *w p?? d b?f?re he i?8*6 contact with the hostlles.'
25 *ort Hlley. Letters, letter dated April 27, 1867.
26 ?£=retary of Mar, Annual Report . 1867, 229.X Dd.da * 4"0 »
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service with respect to caliber and construction. But the
Cavalry continued for some years to use a variety of large
caliber carbines.
o began the slow development of an efficient armed
force. The improvement in weapons, the conviction of the
limitations on expansion imposed by the lack of troops, and the
growth of a feeling of unity in the line regiments was a definite
step forward. 3ut the events in the organization of the newly
activated regiments threw a dull cloud on the otherwise clear-
ing horison.
The 7th Cavalry, one of these new regiments, w:.s acti-
vated at Fort Riley, Kansas, on July 28, 1866.2? Immediately
the problem of desertions began to haunt Lt. Col. George A.
Custer, its commander. Acutely aware of the amount of public
funds expended by the government in recruiting each man and
of the prospect of a summer campaign with a decimated com-
mand, Colonel Custer urged the War Department to increase
the severity of the punishment for deserters.2 ** gy March
of that year, he reports i that the increase in the rate of
desertion from his command had risen meteorically from 120
percent to 2>K> percent.29 Two &a#i liter he resigned
2Z Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1866, 73.
«"> Port Riley, Letters , letter dated February 13, 1867.
Lt. Col. Custer estimated the cost of recruiting, trans-
portation to Fort Riley, clothing, equipping, and moxjnt-
ing a trooper at .s7.0O0.00, a not unlikely figure.
*? Fort Riley, Letters , letter dated March 6, 1867.
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himself to a guard house full of prisoners as his principal
command.3°
Sven in the midst of these difficulties, and before
its organization had been completed, detachments of the
7th Cavalry were on outpost duty in four posts west of
Fort Riley.31 Both men and horses ware the rawest sort of
recruits when they moved out to the theater of active oper-
ations. The cumbersome equipment tied about the saddle, the
overburdened, uncomfortable recruit, and the skittish, half-
frightened horse were not reassuring to the worried pioneer
who was living in daily fear of the hateful attack of the
nomadic Indians. Still, this regiment was the only Cavalry
available in the Department of the Missouri ,32 so out into
the unkind prairies rode these babes of war.
It was the same story over again, the urgency of the
situation left no time for training. All too frequently the
first shot fired from the recruit's recently issued carbine
was aimed in the general direction of a hostile Indian.^
Sven those who were veterans of the late war were unsettled
by the Irregular charge and retreat tactics of this new foe.
Like their compatriots to the nox»th, i.fte officers and men
30 Fort Riley, Letters , letter dated March 8, 1867. The
Colonel morosely explained that he would soon be forced
to place the apprehended deserters in a company barrack
and the evicted company in the guard house.
Jx Fort Riley, Letters , letter dated March 8, 1867. These
posts were Fort Harker, Fort Lyon, Fort Wallace, and
Fort Morgrm.
\% Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1867, 3?.33 e. B. Custer, Quidon."!!.
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learned their trade in actual combat. Drill, that repeti-
tious fixing of reflexive response to command, came wherever
troops were located and whenever there was time. During the
summer, the men stationed at Fort Hays were drilled every
evening^* in the intricate evolutions of the cavalry arm
after spending the day on picket duty, guarding the horse
herd, and the other innumerable time-consuming tasks of a
cavalry unit. Occasionally buffalo hunts were organized with
the express purpose of training men and horses in the use
of firearms and in horsemanship," a method consciously or
unconsciously taken from the training manual of the noble
red man. Thus, as the regiment served its function as a
protector of homesteaders, it was slowly metamorphosed into
a machine of war*
Just as Colonel Carrington^s men suffered from the
parsimonious issue of supplies, so the Seventh was weakened
by insufficient and spoiiad rations. Doxe:; of provisions
were found to contain little more than stones; hardtack. was
issued to the troops that had been baked six yoars before.
Bacon and flour were stored on the open prairie with only
a tarpaulin for covering until ths heat made the bacon ranoid
and the rains made the flour moldy. Such food was perforce
Issued with the expected result in scurvy and disease in the
troops of the entire region. Cholera, too, appeared to
further unsettle the morale of the men. Men fled from the
3* Fort Hays, Orders, Special Order No. 58, dated July 27,
,- 1867.
'
37 0. A. Custer, op. elt.
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Army to escape these plagues, and any scouting expedition
that approached the mining regions was sura to have some men
desert.36
Desertion became as infectious as the diseases that were
partially its cause. On one scouting expedition, 13 men
deserted in broad daylight just as the regiment prepared to
move out on the march. 37 on another occasion a first-
sergeant and ko men took flight during the night leaving
their captain and 20 comrades stranded at a small post on
the South Platte River.38
Such insubordination and lack of discipline was the
direct consequence of the evils of the service. Half-starved,
discouraged men, who had been thrown into a summer-long series
of fruitless scouting expeditions with no basic military
training and whose officers were inexperienced in controlling
troops and poorly trained in this type of warfare, were sure
to take the matter into their own hands and escape such
unnecessary suffering if the opportunity offered itself.
These conditions, plus the fixation in the military
mind that only cavalry could successfully overcome Indians,
forced General Hancock, the Department of the Missouri
oomnander, to assume a defensive strategy. Some officers
despaired of ever successfully taking the field with such
green troop3 as heavily laden as the United States Cavalry
36 E. B. Custer, Tentlnn
. 391*.H G. A. Custer, op. cit. . 100.
1° E. B. Custar, Tenting . 395.
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against an opponent whose remount and commissary were assets
rather than impedimenta.39 But the high command was certain
that only defensive measures were possible due to lack of
troops and transport.*5
The resulting strategy was the aforementioned scatter-
ing of regiments to small posts at what v;as hoped were
strategical poiii-3. But General Sherman, commanding the
Division of the Missouri, was the champion of the necessity
for offensive action. He realized the difficulties of con-
tinuously transporting supplies into such a vast arena, and
the truly enormous numbers of troops that would be necessary
to adequately control that area by defensive measures.
Despite the lack of cavalry troops, Sherman pursued that
policy to the best of his ability by keeping all available
Cavalry units in the field and moving towards the spot where
hostiles had last been reported. This he well realized,
would not suffice and he made plans to take more decisive
measures. As his first step, Sherman had General Philip
Sheridan recalled from the South and installed him in the
command of the Department of the Missouri in place of
General Hancock."
Sheridan surveyed the situation personally, moved his
headquarters from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Hays, and began
to formulate his plan.
39 Trobrland, op. cit. . 55.
J™ Secretary of War. Annual Report . H77, 17.7* Senate . Executive Document No. 7, 'O Cong., 1 Sess., 1867.
7% Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1867, 35.
*3 ibid. . 56.
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CHAPTER VII
THE CONQUERORS
The soldier of long years 9hould not lack either rank or pay-
ment. For the'-.e men, who sire up permanent haoplness for
perishable honor are worthy of reward. 1
Tamerlane, the Earth-Shaker.
From the Washita to the Black Hills, 1868 - l&7h
Oeneral Philip Henry Sheridan was Irish, 37, and
aggressive when he assumed command of the Department of
the Missouri. His personal dash and courage had turned the
tide at Winchester in 186^. His thoroughness and aggressive
attitude on the Mexican border had intimidated the waning
support of the Emperor Maximlllian in 186?. His administra-
tive and policy-making abilities had been tested and found
true in the Oulf Command and occupation duties in 1866. Now
he brought all of these forces to bear on the hostilities of
the Southern Plains Tribes. A short inspection tour in
March, 1868, convinced him of the Indian's discontent with
the terms of the Medicine Lodge Treaty.2 The sporadic but
effective Indian raids continued through the summer and they
convinced the Oeneral of the need for decisive offensive actlon.3
1 Lamb, op. clt. . 167.
The Medicine Lodge Treaty was made in October, 1867, near
Medicine Lodge, Kansas. The treaty placed the Indians on
reservations and granted them annuities, schools, farm
equipment, etc., in return. The only official interpreter
spoke Comanche and many of the attending Indians may neverhave understood what the powwow was about. Nye, op. cit. .5o. "
J Michael V. Sheridan, Personal .lemoirs of Philip ilenrv
Sheridan . (New York
, 1<)02), 2»2bv|7. P ^
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The experience of that summer also convinced him of the futil-
ity of pursuing raiding parties over Ion , distances. The idea
grew in his mind that the only time the Army could decisively
engage an Indian force was in winter when the nomads were Im-
mobilized by lack of forage for their horses.^- With thess
thoughts in mind, General Sheridan projected a long range plan.
Cavalry units in the field were ordered to conserve their
horses and abstain from any pursuit of raiding parties unless
the chance of success was obvious. A depot of supplies was
opened near the area of expected operations, iinough rations,
ammunition, and forage were assembled at that point for a
winter-long campaign. Plainsmen were selected as scouts.
Reinforcements were requested, and when these proved insuffic-
ient, the State of Kansas was asked to muster a volunteer
cavalry regiment. The 7th Cavalry was pulled out of the field,
and the entire regiment was re-equipped, drilled in maneuver,
and intensively trained in marksmanship,? a practice almost
as revolutionary as the idea of a winter campaign on the Plains.
Jim Bridger, the famous scout, said it was foolish to
go out on the prairie in the winter, but by October the prelim-
inary ii- ients were completed. In November the various
columns moved on the rendezvous area about 100 miles south of
Fort Dodge at a point which they named Camp Supply. From this
base, the troops struck directly into hostile country. The
J}
Ibid. . 297.
' Q. A. Custer, op. cit. . 190.
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campaign was not ended until March, 1869. It was the most
decisive blow ever struck by the Army. The Southern Tribes,
the Cheyennes, Kiowas, and Arapahoes, were forced into the new
reservation established at Fort Sill, which post had been
founded during the campaign.? Not that this ended all Indian
hostilities in the area.8 Warfare like that fought on the
Plains never ends except with annihilation or, as finally did
occur, with the destruction of the economic strength of the
Indian ~ his horse and the buffalo.
The Army now appeared to be a truly effective force, at
least in the newspapers. However, even by the standards of
military efficiency its potential was improving. There was
concrete evidence of the growth of unity in the regiments.
9
Hard campaigning brought out the professional pride of the
Regulars and grumbling was at a minimum. 10 The new breech-
loading Springfield rifle was now in the hands of all lnfantry-
6 The campaign was highlighted by Custe;'s destruction of the
Cheyenne village of Black Kettle on the Washita. Skeptios
and critics frequently view this attack with horror and
they recall that the same chief had been the leader of the
group so barbarically attacked at Sand Creek. That this
band was worthy of annihilation is clearly shown in General
Sheridan's report. Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1869,
„ li>+7-8. '
' W. S. Nye, Carbine and Lance . (Eorman, 1937), 123. The
first stake was held by General Sheridan and driven by
Pvt. Johnny Murphy, the General's ambulance driver, on
o January 8, 1869.
Mrs. Frank C. Montgomery. "Fort Wallace and Its Relation to
Q Indian depredations in the years 1868 and 1869.
" Armes, «-- *«*- '»«
1 id.
.
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men. Cavalry weapons, too, were standardized. Two patterns
were still In us
,
the Spencer and the Sharps, but both were
.50 caliber and both used fixed ammunition.11 There was little
complaining about rations, either as to quantity or quality.
Health standards were improving also. The Quartermaster Gen-
eral was a bit disgusted with the vanity of the line troopers.
His surplus stooks of large size clothing were being depleted
because the men, dissatisfied with the effect gained from any
of the four standard sizes, were prone to requisition clothing
larger than they could wear and to have them fitted by their
company tailor. 12 However, the men's complaints against the
equipment were more relevant to the efficiency of the service.
Blankets were reported to be of a very inferior quality and
unit pride was not improved by the issuing of coats and trou-
sers of various shades of blue. Such a condition generated
a complete lack of uniformity in the dress of companies.*3
The design of tents, too, needed to be changed to fit the
climatic conditions of the West. The square-cornered A-tents
were blown helter-skelter by the winds. The Sibley, which was
infrequently used, was rounded and much more secure.1^
These complaints were minor, but steps were wisely taken
to eliminate them. A process to prevent moth damage and mil-
dew and to waterproof clothing was adopted,1? and by 1873 a
11 Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1869, liMf2.
£^ Secretary of War, Annual Report . I870, ltlW.
•}* E. B. 'ouster, Tenting. 3^7-8.
"-' House of Representatives . Executive Document No. 189,
H2 Cong., 3 Sess., 1B73.
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new uniform was selected and issued, though some of the more
distant posts wore not supplied with them until the next year.16
^
In 1870, the Inspector General reported an improvement in police
and sanitation, and in drill and military exercise.1''
But this idyllic progress was halted by the ghost of the
military in the United States, a parsimonious Congress.
The first move made by that august body proved to be most bene-
ficial. The officer corps was over-loaded with officers who
had been granted permanent commissions during the War Between
the States. In an attempt to cut down the list of supernumer-
ary officers, Congress made provision for dropping from the rolls
those officers found by an examining board to be unfit for ser-
vice by reason of intemperance or vicious habits.1® The work
of the "Benzine Boards" markedly improved the efficiency of the
corps. That commanders approved such action is attested by
a petition presented Congress requesting that certain officers
not be re-instated for the good of the service.
W
The next act of Congress fell more heavily. The number
of Infantry regiments was ordered cut back from >+5 to 25 and
the number of officers as well as enlisted men was to be re-
20duced. This consolidation was attempted immediately and the
necessary officers were selected by date of rank, provided
the senior officer was deemed qualified and was present
1° Secretary of War, Annual Report
f 1873, lt87.H Seci-olary of War, Annual Report . I87O, 1:92.
£? Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1668, 1j17.
2n jjenate > Executive Document No. 52, 1*5 Cong., 2 Sess., 1878.*u Secretary of War, Annual Report
, 1869, 1»23.
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for duty. But one purpose of the program, the elimination of
excess officers, was almost nullified by the inelastic retire-
ment law. Congress therefore passed the act of July 15, 1870,
whereby the retirement list was increased and the President was
allowed to reassign officers either to regimental duty or to the
supernumerary list. Department comaanders were asked to list
inefficient officers and boards held hearings to determine those
officers' qualifications. The officers on the supernumerary
list wero then honorably discharged on January 1, I871, with
one year's pay and allowances to complete the consolidation.21
Such determined action caused an upset in the mental equili-
brium of the Army and many injustices were undoubtedly pro-
22pagated. Officers became extremely conscious of every decision
and the fear and respect for this modern inquisition was to in-
fluence officers' thinking and actions for many years. Still,
the over-all effect was beneficial. Many unfit officers were
eliminated and the service immediately strengthened. This new
awareness was salutary also, since it now behooved an officer
to be more certain in his decisions which tacitly encouraged
thought and attention, if not study, to tactics and professional
skill. Promotions were by no means easy after the shakeup. The
retirement list, though increased, remained full; yet there was
more of an opportunity for a young man to advance than had existed
previously.
1 Secretary of War, Annual Report . I87O, ljvi.
" W. A. Graham, The Story of the Little 31: Horn . (Uarris-
burg, Perm., c. 1926), xiv.
The soldier, too, cjae in for his full share of scrutiny.
The elimination of excess men while consolidating the regi-
ments was not such a problem in this respect. The government
had to fulfill its contract and retain the soldier until his
enlistment expired, but this was comparatively simple since
the men had been enlisted largely for three years and many
enlistments were being completed that year.23 Therefore the
enlisted men were not plagued by uncertainty as were the of-
ficers. If anything, they were reassured since those that
re-enlisted signed up for a period of five years rather than
three.
For the soldier, the ax of economy in Washington fell
in the form of a reduction in pay from $16.00 to $13.00 per
month for the private soldier and corresponding decreases
for all enlisted ranks. The effect wag like an electric
shock. Apparently every soldier remembered he had Important
business elsewhere and the desertion rate soared to new
heights. He-enlistments, on the other hand, fell to a new
low.*4. The recruiting service was hard put to keep regiments
anywhere near effective strength. Those men that did enlist
did so only to gain some Immediate necessity or transportation
at government expense to the West and then deserted as soon
as they could. The boom in railroad building and the never
satisfied need for men in the mines provided a tremendous
labor market and the Army seemed doomed to supply it. This
23 Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1869, 1»26.
Secretary of War, Annual iteport . 1871, 1:73.
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situation demanded imraeliate action and Congress, thor-
oughly aroused to the urgency of the matter, passed a new
pay bill on May 15, 1872. The new provisions did not raise
the pay scale, but offered a reward for faithful service.
Sach man was to receive a raise of one dollar per month for
his third, fourth, and fifth year of service, thus giving him
a three dollar increase over his base pay during his fifth
year of service. This money was to be retained pay and would
be given to the soldier upon his discharge from service and
was to be forfeited if he should desert.2 5 A somewhat sim-
ilar provision made it possible for enlisted men to deposit
whatever funds they desired with the paymaster. All accounts
exceeding $50.00 were to draw six per cent annual interest.
Both deposit and interest were held until discharge and were
subject to forfeiture by desertion.2^
The salutary effects were not immediate. In the first
place, not many men would enjoy the raise in pay for at
least another year. Meanwhile the high wages as a day lab-
orer were close at hand. Few deserters were ever apprehended
on the frontier.2? a well-mounted man, accustomed to the
saddle, could outdistance all pursuit with only a few hours
head-start. Once they had found work, they were protected
from searchers by their employers.
There was another element contributing to disaffection
in the service. This was the inequality of sentences adjudged
?f Statutes at Large . 17sl60.
f Ibid^, 161.
' Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1873, It 88.
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by different court-martial boards for Identical offenses.2 **
Petty breaches of discipline were punished severely in com-
parison to other more serious crimes wherein the sentence
might be fixed by presidential order. Once this fact pene-
trated to the high command, steps w re taken to rectify it
and the discipline began to reassert itself in the service.
The reorganization and its inherent problems seemed to be
near a final solution. The Army was again finding an internal
equilibrium and officers and men could face the new day with
some security and assurance.
The Army was learning} slowly as armies do, but never-
theless it was discovering how to get along with Itself in
its new environment. It was learning how to cope with its
enemies in the field too. Officers learned that there were
more alternatives than either success or failure of a cam-
paign. Too many expeditions wore out their horses and ex-
hausted their men without making any contact with Indians
either hostile or friendly.29 Their tactics were improving
also; they were learning how to foil the prince of horse
thieves, the Plains Indian. Every detachment in the field
had struck camp and was mounted and in ranks when the sun
rose to meet the frequent attempts of the Indians to stam-
pede their stock,3° Cavalrymen had learned to avoid mounted
contact with these aboriginal centaurs. Dismounted action
g Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1872, l«i+.
f* G. A. Custer, op. cit. t 34.3" Raymond L. Welty, "The Dally Life of the Frontier Soldier."
The Cavalry Journal
f 361 587, 1927.
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gave greater accuracy in firing, and only accurate fire
would stop the mad rush of the red man. Infantrymen, too,
were discovering the efficacy of their long-range rifles and
their ability to withstand a mounted charge. Wagon trains
with veteran infantry as flankers could continue to move
while under attack. "Stop and fight" became the Infantry
tactic. Press the Indian with fire and pursuit. Always
seize the initiative and take offensive action and the red
man could be dissuaded of his purpose and his formations
could be scattered into inefficacious individuals.31
In 1871 not a white man was killed by Indians in the
Department of the Platte.32 But in other Departments things
were not so quiet. The red man quickly sensed the change
of government policy with the coming of the Friends as
Indian agents in 1869. The savages began a period of intim-
idation and horse stealing. One Kiowa chief formulated a
plan to steal every cavalry horse at Fort Sill. Only the
lack of discipline among his men made the plan fail. All
in all, the Indian considered the Peace Policy a "howling
success. "33 To the north, the irreconcilable Uncapapa Sioux
attacked, with little success, the troops guarding the con-
struction gangs of the Northern Pacific railway.31* In 1873,
the frontier was restless.
31 Miles. Serving the Republic. 163.
32 Secretary of War. Annual Report . 1871, I131.
33 Nye, pp. cit. . l&^PH
3* Hafen, op. cit. . 365.
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Nevertheless, General Pope, now the commander of the
Department of the Missouri, persisted In attempting to
prevent rather than to punish Indian depredations. His cav-
alry units had been kept in the field all summer moving
about slowly and rather aimlessly in an attempt to intimi-
date wandering parties of Indians. By November tenth he
had withdrawn all his troops from the field and prepared to
settle down and enjoy the winter.
Pope's immediate superior, Sheridan, was not out from
the same cloth. He had been promoted to Lieutenant-General
and given command of the Division of the Missouri in 1869.
3
6
With his characteristic vigour, he appeared briefly in the
field. In a counter-move to Pope's passive defense, he set
four columns in motion, each moving from a different base of
operation. Each column converged on the hostiles simultan-
eously, striking at the Indian's horses and villages in order
to wear the hostiles down. Killing Indians was to be a
secondary objective. 37 Under the command of Colonel Kelson
A. Miles the scheme was pushed vigorously and the end result
was the final complete subjugation of the Southern Tribes.
To the north, Sheridan faced a different problem. The
range of the numerous Sioux tribes was enormous and completely
uncontrolled. Military posts were not situated to render the
greatest advantage as supply bases for fast-moving columns.
35 Secretary of War, Annual Henort . 1873, l»l*3.J° Sheridan, op. clt. . ^60.
37 Nye, op. cit. . J72.
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There were few settlers In the country. In anticipation of
trouble, Sheridan determined to establish new posts in such
positions as would be of the most strategic value. The 7th
Cavalry, stationed at Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory,
was sent into the Black Hills on an exploring and scientific
expedition. In the fall of 1871*-, Custer returned without
sighting an Indian, with several good sites for posts, and
bursting with news of gold.38
The Gold Rush to Conquest, l&7h - 1876
Gold has a peculiar power over the mind of the American.
There are laws governing the ownership of property which is
known to have gold ore in it, but they are special laws,
laws beyond those governing private property of a less
valuable sort. By some peculiar rationalization, lands owned
by Indians did not come under the protection of even those
special laws. At least such lands had never before been pro-
tected by law. But things were different in the Black Hills.
Many miners found themselves under arrest by United
States troops; their outfits were destroyed and they were
summarily carted to the Jail at Fort Laramie. General Terry
issued specific orders to that effect in the Department of
Dakota, General Crook accompanied his troops from the De-
partment of the Platte and personally ejected a group of
miners." Howe/er, Crook could see beyond the Indian claims
38 Sheridan, op. olt. . 500-1.
•3" Hafen, op. cit. . 367-9.
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and, while he executed his orders, he mused over the many
horses that had been stolen by Sioux Indians and had never
been recovered for fear of perpetrating a general outbreak.
1
*
Sveryone was restless now. Crook, conqueror and champion
of the Apaches in New Mexico and Arizona, was ready to agraa
with his chief as to the need for decisive offensive action.
When a small band of Cheyenne and Arapahoe blusteringly
asked if the United States wanted war the reply was "yes" e*
unless the red man would return to their reservations and
cease their depredations. 1*1
Sven so, the Army was in favor of stamping out illegal
traffic with the Indians In arms and liquor. After the val-
iant stand of the buffalo hunters at Adobe Wells, they re-
quested aid from troops to protect their trading post and
they were flatly refused such aid because their post was
not licensed to trade with Indians.'4'2 The situation was
still in a state of confusion from the divided administra-
tion by the Army and the Indian Bureau, but the Army was
beginning to champion the red nan's cause against the en-
croachment of the white man. A peculiar affinity was being
born between the rival warriors.
The general morale of the Army was beginning to improve.
The Secretary of Vfar, after a personal tour of the western
posts, was satisfied that the reflections cast on the dlaoi-
>3 n!^ary °i ^ar » WJ nn<?V%, 1875, li69-70.7* Secretary of War, Annual ;teno?ff 107!+, 1,25.
Ibid,.* 30.
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pline of this force were not true. To the contrary, disci-
pline and efficiency were constantly Improving.
Physical standards were certainly higher than since
before the war. Only 20 per cent of the applicants for
enlistment were being accepted. Within the service deser-
tions were rapidly declining and re-enlistments were increas-
ing every year .^3 ThB records of trials by general court-
martial showed that most offenses were of a petty character.
The largest number of convictions by courts-martial in 1876
were charges of absent without leave, followed by drunkeness,
and then disorders. These have never been considered major
crimes in the service. 1* The low pay of non-commissioned
officers contributed to their inefficiency and increased
the number of cases of insubordination according to some
field commanders. 1*? Nevertheless, the 5J22.00 per month
received by a first-sergeant of a line company plus additional
pay for longevity was deemed sufficient by higher authority.
Some commanders urged more mental and physical amusement for
soldiers. It was believed that men should have a feeling of
being occupied in some agreeable and useful duty, and any
sort of approved recreation would add to their mental ease
and help the men to overcome the eternal boredom. 1*6
This consideration of ways and means to Improve the life
and the mental standards of the enlisted man typified the
"2 fbidf
a
i0728.
War
'
Amual iMKtl l876, 1.72.
U-l S***f""5r of *V/ar, Annual Ae-nor-t , i8?h. U3,k.** Secretary of War, Annual aebort-? 1376,' 1,^3.
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change In attitude of the officers of the United States Army.
The "Benzine Boards" were stimulating the zeal and professional
interest of every officer. Very few of the officers appointed
in 1866 remained on active duty 10 ye^rs later. Those on duty
were constantly under the threat of suspension or dismissal
from the service for any failure in performing their duties.
Colonel J. J. Reynolds partial victory over Crazy Horse in
the early spring of 1876 is a case in point. Despite the des-
truction of the Indian village and all its accumulation of food
and ammunition, he was found guilty by a court-martial and sus-
pended from rank and command for one year on the specification
of not fully exploiting his advantage.^7 All officers became
sensitive to any charges against them, even those in the public
press, and it became the custom for an officer to demand a
public inquiry to clear his record for future reference. 1*8
All this made the Army appear ridiculous at times, but it
served to make officers consider every action beforehand and
thus contributed to the proficiency of the service.
The efficiency gained by standardization of armament had
been accomplished by 1875. All small-arms used by the Army
were now constructed on the Springfield breech-loading pattern
and were caliber A?. The controversy over the excellence
of this weapon has led to the belief that it was not a good
j*7 Schmitt, on. cit. . footnote on 192.
House of Representativaa. iixeoutive Document No. ll+2.Wuong., 1 sess., 1876. '
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design for military service. 1^ Lt , ooifr9y> a survivor of
the Little Big Horn battle, s:iid, "Our carbines clogged
and would not work well, on account of lirt and dust on
the ammunition and in the carbines."50 Such a statement
might indicate a habit of putting a protective coat of grease
in the ohamber and barrel of the weapon, in which case the
extractor could be expected not to function if the weapon
had been carried a few hours after cleaning. Mrs. Ouster
referred to the short range of the cavalry carbine and its
inaccuracy. 51 On the other hand, Sergeant Windolph, »H"
Company, 7th Cavalry, said that the effective range of the
weapon was too yards. 52 This range is all that is expected
from the rifle carried by today's infantryman, while the
carbine used has an extreme a curate range of only 300 yards.
In view of these facts, one must conclude that the Army
simply did not realize the capabilities of this weapon and
that the Inadequate training in marksmanship and incorrect
methods of care and preservation of breech-loading firearms
were the limiting factors and not the weapon. In thia
respect, then, the Army in I876 was not realizing the full
potential of Its equipment.
Congress unwittingly aided this adverse situation in
187"+ when it appropriated sufficient funds to produce only
52 Hunt, op,, oitrr&r
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tan rounds of metallic ammunition per soldier for the entire
year.'J Obviously little of this ammunition could be used
for training or experimental purposes. The Quartermaster's
Department, too, felt the pinch for it was necessary to cut
off some allowances to which the troops were entitled to
keep expenditures within its appropriation. The worst blow,
however, fell on the over-worked soldier of the Plains, be-
cause the strength of the Army was limited to 2?,000 men,
a cut back of 5,000.^ But during most of these years, the
men were well supplied with clothing and equipment. The
new uniforms were Issued to all troops, and were proving
more satisfactory than the old type. The best improvements
were the new, broad-brimmed, felt campaign hat and the cart-
ridge belt which replaced the worthless kepi-style forage
cap and the clumsy cartridge box.?? Stronger, lighter, and
better-fitted boots were also issued to all troopers. Some
improvoment was made in winter uniforms, such as the high-
top overshoe, but in this respect men employed In a winter
campaign were still given their choice as to what was the best
clothing.?6
Despite these difficulties, the service was slowly
reaching a higher state of perfection for dealing with its
% Secretary of War, Annual Report . l#fa, l,xviii.bid r r iv.
56
ohn F. Finarty, War-Path and Bivrmajl| (Chicago, o. 1890),
Bourke, op, cit t , 252} Miles, aecollectlons . 219.
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task. The realization of the importance of the individual
soldier led to the practice of training men more thoroughly
while they were in recruiting depots.''' Commanding officers
were taking advantage of every opportunity to train men even
while on campaign. Troops were moved every day to teach
them to prepare to move out quickly and efficiently and to
improve their horsemanship.
Thet-e were more professional soldiers by this time and
units had the efficient appearance and demonstrated an ease
in performing military evolutions that bespoke veteran sol-
diery." General officers could refer to various units with
complete faith in their ability to execute military strategy
and battlefield tactics with promptness and understanding.
The >+th Cavalry was as clean-cut an outfit as one could
find. Its Colonel Mackenzie was as tough as rawhide and
his punishment of misdemeanors was quick and harsh. At the
same time he wrangled promotions for his officers60 and pro-
vided adequate uniform equipment for his men. Mackenzie
made the Fourth and it would follow him to the end of the
earth.
The 5th Cavalry, too, was a veteran unit by 1876.
Every officer had been under Indian fire61 and the majority
57 secretary of War, Annual Report . 1875, 1:3.
•£? Bourke, op. eit.
. 257!
™ Jonn U. 3ourke, "Mackenzie's Last Fight with the Cheyennes."Journal of the Mili tary Service Institution . 53i3*f6.
g. November - December, 1913. —' '
Parker, op. cit.. h?. Some officers reached a captaincy
, after only twelve years servicejaL King, op. clt.
t 7.
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of its troopers ware serving on their second or third enlist-
ment. Like the others, the Seventh possessed the hard core
of confidence in their capabilities that comes only to vet-
erans. Colonel Custer's good judgment of horses made it the
best mounted regiment in the service. 62 Much has been said
of the recruits in the outfit in 1876, but Sergeant Windolph
discounts that excuse by saying that about half of the 150
new men were veterans of the War Between the States or had
served a previous hitch in the service.63 Another promin-
ent participant of the Yellowstone Campaign of 1876 was the
5th Infantry. Its colonel, Nelson A. Miles, was the young-
est colonel in the service. 614- Under Miles, the Fifth had
fought the decisive campaign against the Southern Tribes in
1871*-. It was Miles who had established the first military
gymnasium and the 5th Infantry had been conditioned by the
earliest field-training exercises. Marksmanship had been
drilled into them too. 6' This regiment was trained to a fine
edge as athletes and as soldiers. In addition to this, the
Fifth boasted the best record for discipline of any regi-
ment in the service. These and the other units that marched
on the Sioux Nation in I876 wera all competent veterans.
General officers, too, knew their Jobs. Sherilan fore-
saw the uprising and did everything possible to eliminate
the supply problem beforehand by establishing huge depots
62
63 Srininstool, sSxJ^jLt 23.
ft Hunt, op. ait. . 50.
°Z Sheridan, op. cit. f if99.
°y Miles, Serving the Republic
f 1V3.
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of rations, ammunition, and forage on the Yellowstone River
a year in advance. He planned his strategy on the same con-
centric movements that had succeeded on the Southern Plains.•
Field commanders, such as George Crook, were available to
carry out the Division Commander's strategy and to insure
its success. Crook, more than any other field commander,
realized the paradoxical problem of supply that faced any
armed force in this region, that is, the need for speed and
the necessity for large amounts of bulky material. When his
column moved in the spring, it was accompanied by a wagon
train of 86 wagons and a pack train of five divisions of
80 mules each. ' Even this was not considered a redundancy.
Officers were ordered to mess with the men to save space on
the wagons.
There were other evidences of knowledge about Indian
fighting in this campaign. The cavalry units boxed up their
sabers as useless weapons and left them in garrison.^ The
Infantry left swords, bayonets, knapsacks, and cartridge
boxes behind. They were stripped to the essentials for a
fighting man — strong clothing, good food, and plenty of
ammunition. ^
Tactical leaders were convinced by now of the ineffloacy
of desultory scouting. All minds were guided by the nec-
essity for fresh troops and strong horses to follow the
66°° Secretary of War, Annual flenort . 187?, 1:29.% Bourke, op. cit. l 2&. *** "* "*
<~ Brininstool, op. cit. . 2?.
°* Miles, Serving the ?,e public
T 1>*1.
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hoatiles relentlessly to a final conclusion or to the last
ounce of the pursuers' strength.'
The campaign was opened, strangely enough, in Chicago.
By means of the telegraph, General Sheridan directed the
first movement to begin. General Terry's column, which
included Custer's 7th Cavalry, advanced from Fort Abraham
Lincoln, Dakota Territory, on the east. Colonel John Gibson,
acting under Terry's orders, moved from Fort Ellis, Montana.
General Crook advanced from Fort Fetterman, Wyoming. The
Department Comnanders, Generals Crook and Terry, were to
move independently of each other and were to ignore depart-
ment boundaries in the effort to actively and passively exert
constant pressure on all wandering bands of Indians.
The entire campaign was marked by the activity and
accuracy of Army intelligence. The famous battle where
Buffalo Bill killed Chief Yellow Hand in a duel and the
5th Cavalry drove the Indian reinforcements back to their
agency was ordered by Sheridan in Chicago! 71 Only once was
Sheridan's ability not appreciated. Crook, in reply to
Sheridan's order to hit them again, laconically remarked,
"It is rather difficult to surround three Indians with one
72
soldier."' For on that important point, due to the posi-
tive statements of Indian Bureau Agents about the small
numbers of warriors who had left the agencies to join the
7° Secretary of War, Annual Report . 1875, li8lf.
Xi King, oo. cit. . 17.
<* Finerty, op. cit. . 181.
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hostiles, the Army intelligence made a fatal mis Judgment.73
No Army man expected to find more than 500 warriors in the
field. In March, Crook, the first to realize the error, met
a force equal to his own at the Rosebud, a thousand warriors.^
By the end of July the 7th Cavalry would meet a force esti-
mated by Reno and Benteen at 2,510 fighting men.^ Never had
the Indians been in such large numbers j never had they
fought with such discipline} never had they been led with such
skill.
The converging columns of blue-coated troopers began
to develop the situation immediately after taking the field.
Both field commanders made contact with Indians or with
trails of Indian villages. General Terry sent the Seventh
out on an independent scout to make contact and to fix
what was believed to be the main body of hostiles. The
ensuing action was the legendary Custer Massacre. Now
Terry as well as Crook realized the full strenght of the
hostiles. Cautiously the column took up its movement from
the Little Big Horn and moved toward its unexpected Junction
with Crook.
The two independent commands had executed a perfect
pincers movement without being aware of their luck, and the
wily Sioux slipped away from the converging columns, bag
and baggage, with neither com'aander aware of their movement.
? Sheridan, op. cit.
, 505.
3 Vestal, op. cit. . 221.
75 Senate. Executive Document No. 8l, ¥+ Cong., 1 Sess., 1876.
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Plainly disgusted, Crook grimly stripped his troopers to the
barest essentials and with fifteen d^ys rations set out on
the longest, hardest march ever executed by a military force
in the Indian Wars.'"
The immediate result seemed inconclusive. Blundering
and mismanagement of well laid plans with nothing accom-
plished seemed to be the recapitulation of the officers of
Terry 1 s column. Staff officers were loud in their blame of
others and hurriedly washed their hands of the whole summer's
operation and the dust of the Yellowstone Valley. Sheridan 1 s
headquarters had nothing to say, but avoided the subject like
a plague. Those few remaining at Terry's he-idquarters were
apologetic. The consensus among the line officers, however,
was blunt and to the point.
The rash and unauthorized conduct of Custer
resulting so fatally, entirely deranged Terry's
plans, but, more than that, demoralized his com-
mand when the reenforceraents arrived. They
found the troops which had been in the field vary
much demoralized, in fact they were afraid of
the Indians.''
76 Robert 0. Athearn, "A Winter Campaign Against the Sioux,"
The i-Iiasisslppl Valley Historical Review. 35*280, Sept-
ember, 19W, footnote. "For a whole month neither offi-
cers nor men had any change of clothing
. . . and no food
except bacon, hard bread and coffee. They had no table
furniture, but ate with their fingers or pocket knives.
During a great part of this time it rained, and night
after night they laid down to sleep ... on the wet
ground, none of them with anything but one blanket and
many of them without any. The clothing wore out and at
lei st one tenth of them came in either without pantaloons
or coats and some without either, marching in shirts and
drawers, they having used the remnants of their outer
clothing to tie around their feet. Many of them marchei
with bleeding feet for they had to either march or die."
'" Ibid. . 279-80.
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The gloom of the winter that settled over the r eglon
fitted the temper of the soldiers who were forced by duty
to remain. Chagrined hut stubborn, Mackenzie equipped the
*rth Cavalry to face the bitter winter and moved out to make
contact with the Northern Cheyennes. In one decisive battle
he broke their power and drove them out into tha snowy wastes
of the mountains.'" idles obstinately prepared for a campaign
to continue all winter in the belief that the Indians must
have no rest, and he drove the 5th Infantry through one
march after another all winter long.^9
The events of the next spring vindicated all those
concerned, however. The exhausted hostlles either reported
to the reservation or fled north into Canada. The wars of
the Northern Plains wore over. There was no intention of
offering the red man a treaty this time. The Regulars of
the United States .?my came as conquerors. ^
78 Bourke, "Mackenzie's Last Fight with the Cheyennes,"
70 op* cit.OL Athearn, op. cit. . 281.
° Secretary of Ear, Annual Report . 1877, 1:85.
98
CHAPTER VIII
EPILOGUE
Some of the cavalry regiments have, during the spring and
summer, traveled in pursuit of Indians, and for the pur-
pose of protecting exposed settlements, a distance of over
four thousand miles, and the hard work and wear and tear
upon both men and animals in those frontier campaigns can
be fully appreciated only by those who are familiar with the
country operated in, and who know its character, the long
distances to be overcome, and the great difficulty of fur-
nishing supplies. This condition of affairs is not only
true for the past year, but it has been nearly the same
thing for the past ten years, and I think I can safely say
that for this length of time no men have ever w orked harder
or shown a higher sense of duty than the little army which
has defended our rapidly-extending western settlements.
1
Lieutenant-General Philip Henry Sheridan, Commanding the
Military Division of the Missouri,
The bitter snow of the winter of 1876 melted slowly
down the red-clay flanks of the Bitterroot Mountains and the
hopes of the American Indian ran with it. Awaiting the war-
riors of Crazy Horse at the hated reservations were the only
white aen they could understand, the soldiers of the United
States Army. The "pony soldiers" and the "walk-a-heaps,"
tough veterans of an undeclared war, took the guns and the
horses from the finest light cavalry in the world. And they
immediately became helpless, vermin-ridden relics of the stone
age sitting moodily in canvas tepees watching trains roar
past them. They knew the trains were scattering thousands of
hated farmers over the broad acres that they, the Dakotah peoples,
had conquered only a comparatively short time ago. Those same
1 Secretary of War, Annual aeport . I878, It 6.
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acres would turn to dust in two generations under the pul-
verizing plowshare.
The red man would adopt one more weapon from the white
man before he would submit to the white man's yoke completely.
Religious faith would become a weapon of revenge. The ghost
dances would try to call back the buffalo from the bowels
of the earth. The messiah would tear the earth away from
the conquerors. Like the early Christians, the ancestors of
the conqueror, the red man would wait until bitter disap-
pointment would convince him of the falseness of his dream.
The soldier who took the Indian's gun stood on the threshold
of a new era, too. For ten long years he and his comrades had
stood to arms in a continuous state of war. The Regular Army
had begun as a loosely-held mob of citizen soldiers led by men
who were unconvinced of the reality of the War on the Plains.
The soldier felt no loyalty to the service. There were no regi-
mental traditions, no standing Jokes in the regiment, no officers
who had become legendary in the service. This lack of cohesion
aggravated the lack of proper equipment, the poor weapons, and
little basic training. Opposing this inefficiency in leadership
and material were the high wages offered by the railroad build-
ers and the mine owners. The very prairies and mountains devel-
oped a malevolent personality. They combined to isolate the
3oldler from his home, to scour him with violent weather, to
stretch before him to infinity, to bore him, and to frighten
him. They presented a problem in logistics and supply that
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the mule and wagon never completely solved. The most popular
antidote to these things became desertion. The Army would
cynically remark that their real purpose was to populate the
West.
The whole situation was unique in military annals, as
is every new problem of war. After a slow start and some
bad defeats, the Army began to realize the full scope of
its problem. General Sheridan overturned the time honored
strategy of the Plains with his successful winter campaign.
Then, slowly, the service developed and provided the nec-
essary equipment. Breech-loaders came to the soldier, rations
improved in quality, new uniforms adapted to the Plains were
devised. An economy-minded Congress unwittingly rejuvenated
the officer corps and devised a system of pay for enlisted men
that encouraged honorable service. The enemy, too, contributed
his bit, for a military truism is, "men never develop a true
esprit de corps until they have been in battle together." And
the red man provided all the battle necessary to weld the Army
into a fighting machine.
Courageous leaders with real fighting men at their
command experimented boldly in strategy. Company commanders
devised tactics that by their very stubbornness and tenacity
kept their fast-moving opponents off balance. 3y the end of
the decade everyone had become aware of the importance of the
individual soldier, and that awareness would still be evident
in World War II.
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There ware still major faults in the system. Mobility
and bulk were necessary attributes to a transport system in
this enormous area and mule trains could not meet the demand.
Professional pride was successfully substituted for worn out
equipment and horse meat was eaten in the place of rations.
The sense of Isolation and the feeling of boredom were always
problems for the troops of the West. The mental conversion
to breech-loading weapons came too late to save the colorful
Custer. Sacrifice and stubbornness overcame these short-
comings too.
The trooper that accepted the weapon of his opponent
at the Spotted Tail and Red Gloud Indian agencies had been
tempered in the crucible of experience. He stood on the
threshold of fifteen mora years of this irregular warfare,
a wise, proud, well-equipped veteran. He was a hard-drinking,
hard-swearing professional soldier, perhaps the only specimen
of that breed aver produced by the United States. General
Sherman said he was the hardest working soldier in the
world.2 General Wolseley, chief of the British Army, said
he was, man for man, the best soldier in the world.3
\ Secretary of War, Annual Report . 187k, ljj.
3 Downey, op. cit
T r 3<i$.
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